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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores the effects of a judge’s prior assumptions, 
values, and experiences on judicial decisionmaking.1  There is now a 
 Nicole E. Negowetti is Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. 
1. There is much literature regarding juries, biases, and group dynamics; however, “[i]n the 
day-to-day operation of the legal system, judges are much more important than juries.” Chris 
Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 781 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie, 
Inside the Judicial Mind].  Judges decide roughly as many cases at trial as juries do, they determine 
the outcome of roughly seven times as many cases as juries by ruling on dispositive motions, and 
they often play an active role in settling cases.  Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by 
Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 n.7 (1992).  Even cases 
ultimately resolved by juries are regulated by judges.  They determine what evidence juries will be 
allowed to hear and interpret and instruct juries on the law they are to apply.  Despite its 
importance, far less attention has been devoted to sources of judicial error and bias.  Id.  See Donald 
C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (noting with surprise that “few studies 
analyze the manner and method of the judiciary’s decision-making process”).  This Article focuses 
on judges’ decisionmaking.  “[T]his topic—implicit bias and its role on the judiciary—is a topic on 
the horizon and is likely to become an area of significant discussion and study in the very near 
future.”  John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The 
Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 10 (2010). 
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broad consensus that the impact of past experiences and prior 
assumptions, even those of which we are not conscious, can have great 
power in directing all humans’ present perceptions, judgments, feelings, 
and behaviors.2  However, the notion that judges are subject to the 
effects of cognitive shortcuts remains controversial because of the 
implications to our justice system and the rule of law.  I challenge the 
assumption and aspiration of neutrality in judging and propose an 
approach in line with emerging research from cognitive science.  If 
judges premise their decisionmaking on the notion that there is some 
objective and universal perspective, they are ignoring fundamental 
principles of cognition.  As Judge Cardozo wrote, “We may try to see 
things as objectively as we please.  None the less, we can never see them 
with any eyes except our own.”3 
Cognitive science has revealed that many of our patterns of acting 
and thinking are not governed by reason, but rather are ingrained, 
unconscious, or triggered by our autonomic nervous system.4  Decisions 
based on what we believe to be careful, neutral, and logical reasoning, 
may actually be guided by unexamined and often unseen frameworks of 
thinking.5  There is substantial experimental evidence suggesting that 
human perception is selective.6 Underlying our thinking is a complex 
system of unconscious judgments of people, places, and situations, of 
which we are unaware.  Humans create blueprints based on prior 
experiences to evaluate new situations, people, and ourselves.  We rely 
on mental shortcuts, which psychologists often refer to as “heuristics” or 
“schemas,” to make complex decisions.7  Reliance on these heuristics 
facilitates sound and efficient judgment most of the time, but it can also 
create cognitive illusions that produce erroneous and biased judgments.8  
Because much of our thinking occurs on a subconscious level, we are 
often unaware of the actual causes of our own behavior, thinking, 
emotions, perceptions, and biases.9  “Just as certain patterns of visual 
2.  ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211 (1999).
3.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).
4.  Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and
the Importance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1225, 1238 
(2004). 
5.  Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1217 (2004). 
6.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 7.
7.  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974). 
8.  Id.  Chris Guthrie et al., Judging by Heuristic Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision
Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44, 44 (2002). 
9.  Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
2
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stimuli can fool people’s eyesight, leading them to see things that are not 
really there, certain fact patterns can fool people’s judgment, leading 
them to believe things that are not really true.”10 
It is human nature to desire and believe that we act free of 
prejudices and biases. For judges, it is also a matter of professional 
identity to be impartial arbiters of problems presented for resolution.  
“Few would admit to making biased decisions, especially ones 
motivated by negative biases.”11  For example, most, if not all, judges 
believe that they are fair and objective and that they have decided cases 
in a manner that is in harmony with the facts and pertinent legal issues 
involved.12 
The public’s notion of justice through a fair and unbiased system 
also relies upon the “impartiality” of judges, defined by the American 
Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct as an “absence of 
bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of 
parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues 
that may come before a judge.”13  These expectations of impartiality are 
reflected in the rules governing judges.  There is an expectation, a 
mandate, that judges shed their biases when they take the bench.  For 
example, Canon 2 of the American Bar Association’s Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct requires that “[a] judge shall perform the duties of 
judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or 
prejudice.”14  The United States Code requires a federal judge to 
disqualify himself from the bench “[w]here he has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”15  Model Code Rule 2.2 
directs that “a judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform 
all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”16  A comment 
accompanying this rule adds that “[a]lthough each judge comes to the 
bench with a unique background and personal philosophy, a judge must 
interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves 
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 121 (1994). 
10.  Id.
11.  Irwin & Real, supra note 1, at 10. 
12.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 5. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225-26 (2009) [hereinafter Rachlinski, 
Unconscious Racial Bias] (reporting that 97 percent of judges in an educational program rated 
themselves in the top half of the judges attending the program in their ability to “avoid racial 
prejudice in decisionmaking”). 
13.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology at 4 (2007).
14.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.3(A) (2007).
15.  28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2005).
16.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007).
3
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or disapproves of the law in question.”17 
However, as recent studies have demonstrated, even highly 
qualified judges inevitably rely on cognitive decisionmaking processes 
that can produce systematic errors in judgment.  “Judges, it seems, are 
human.  Like the rest of us, their judgment is affected by cognitive 
illusions that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”18  Indeed, 
judges, like everyone else, are the product of their race,19 ethnicity, 
nationality, socioeconomic status, gender,20 sexuality, religion, and 
ideology.  Ideally, judges reach their decisions utilizing facts, evidence, 
and highly constrained legal criteria, while putting aside personal biases, 
attitudes, emotions, and other individuating factors.21  However, this 
ideal does not coincide with the findings of behavioral scientists, whose 
research has shown that the human mind is a complex mechanism, and 
regardless of conscious or avowed biases and prejudices, most people, 
no matter how well educated or personally committed to impartiality, 
harbor some unconscious or implicit biases.22  Through a blind faith in 
their impartiality, judges may gain a false sense of confidence in their 
decisions.23  They may fail to take into account the unavoidable 
influences we all experience as human beings and disregard the limits of 
human nature and the difficulty of bringing to the conscious level 
subjective motivations, beliefs, and predilections.24  A federal district 
17.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. [2] (2007).
18.  Guthrie, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 1, at 778; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000) (noting 
that judges are susceptible to various biases).  Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 420 
(2007) (“[D]espite their fancy titles, their magisterial robes, and their elevated stature in the 
courtroom, judges are human.  And like all humans, judges err.”); see generally Jerome Frank, Are 
Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931). 
19.  Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis
of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009) (finding that black judges and white 
judges perceive racial harassment differently, which means that decisionmaking process is not 
completely objective; judges bring their personal experiences or lack of experience to bear when 
deciding cases). 
20.  Neil A. Lewis, Debate on Whether Female Judges Decide Differently Arises Anew, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04women.html (analyzing 
Justice Ginsburg’s arguments in a Supreme Court case involving the appropriateness of the strip 
search of a thirteen-year-old girl by school authorities; her experience as a female influences her 
interpretation of the issues and brings a new perspective that would not have been expressed in her 
absence). 
21.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 5.
22.  Id. (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153-60 (D. Kahneman et al. eds., 
1982)). 
23.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 5.
24.  Id.  See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
466 (1897) (noting that the basis for judicial decisionmaking often “lies [in] inarticulate and 
4
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court judge explained how his self-confidence in colorblindness was 
shaken after he received the results of the Implicit Association Test 
(“IAT”)25 that measures implicit racial bias. 
I was eager to take the test.  I knew I would “pass” with flying colors.  
I didn’t. Strongly sensing that my test performance must be due to the 
quackery of this obviously invalid test, I set out to learn as much as I 
could about both the IAT and what it purported to measure: implicit 
bias.  After much research, I ultimately realized that the problem of 
implicit bias is a little recognized and even less addressed flaw in our 
legal system. . . .  I have discovered that we unconsciously act on im-
plicit biases even though we abhor them when they come to our atten-
tion.  Implicit biases cause subtle actions, . . . [b]ut they are also pow-
erful and pervasive enough to affect decisions about whom we employ, 
whom we leave on juries, and whom we believe.  Jurors, lawyers, and 
judges do not leave behind their implicit biases when they walk 
through the courthouse doors.26 
An understanding of how humans comprehend the world—how we 
process new information and how our underlying values, beliefs, and 
experiences translate new experiences27 —necessarily informs our 
understanding of how judges make decisions.  Thus, this Article is a 
challenge to the myth “that a judge puts on that robe and he says, ‘I am 
unbiased; I’m going to call the balls and strikes based on where the pitch 
is placed, not on whose side I’m on. I don’t take sides in the game.’”28 
unconscious judgment”). 
25.  See infra Part II.
26.  Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010). 
27.  “The application of cognitive science to law rests on the following assumption: Law is a
human creation of human minds dwelling in human bodies, in human societies, operating within 
human cultural practices.  And so, to understand how law works, one must know how all these 
aspects of human experience and thought work.”  Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 949, 951 (2002). 
28.  Sessions Says He’s Looking for Judicial Restraint, NAT’L J. (May 7, 2009),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/sessions-says-he-s-looking-for-judicial-restraint-
20090507.  In his confirmation hearing Chief Justice Roberts famously stated that “[j]udges are like 
umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . .  They make sure everybody plays by 
the rules, but it is a limited role.”  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to Be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005).  
Perhaps judges are more like umpires, or referees than Chief Justice Roberts realized.  A recent 
study demonstrates that referees are not exempt from implicit biases.  See Joseph Price & Justin 
Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13206, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13206.pdf (finding that “more 
personal fouls are called against players when they are officiated by an opposite-race refereeing 
crew than when officiated by an own-race crew.  These biases are sufficiently large that we find 
5
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While Judge Posner asserts that no “knowledgeable person actually 
believed or believes that the rules that judges in our system apply, 
particularly appellate judges and most particularly the Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of baseball are 
given to umpires,”29 and scholars generally acknowledge that “we are all 
realists now,”30 the script of judicial dispassion, or detachment, remains 
entrenched in Western jurisprudence.31 
The idea that a good judge is able to insulate her decisionmaking 
from any emotional influence is deeply rooted in European 
Enlightenment notions of rationality and objectivity, to which emotion 
was thought to be opposed.  As Thomas Hobbes declared in 1651, the 
ideal judge was portrayed as one who was “divested of all fear, anger, 
hatred, love, and compassion.”32  Judicial dispassion was claimed to be a 
“fundamental tenet of Western jurisprudence” because emotionless 
judging was perceived as necessary to the democratic structure and the 
“process of taming the self-interested passions of the public.”33 
As Erwin Chemerinsky explains, a view of judicial decisionmaking 
as purely rational is appealing because 
[i]f judges just applied the law in a formalistic way, then results would 
be a product not of the human beings in the robes, but of the laws 
themselves.  The identity of the judges would have little effect, so long 
as the individuals on the bench had the intelligence and honesty to 
faithfully carry out their duties.”34 
“[T]oo often we are content to believe that bias and prejudice do not 
appreciable differences in whether predominantly black teams are more likely to win or lose, based 
on the racial composition of the refereeing crew.”).  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the 
Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1069, 1069 (2006) (“An umpire applies rules created by others; the Supreme Court, through its 
decisions, creates rules that others play by.  An umpire’s views should not make a difference in how 
plays are called; a Supreme Court Justice’s views make an enormous difference.”). 
29.  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, 78 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK]. 
30.  Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 410 (2012).  See, e.g., Joseph
William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (“All major current schools 
of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism.”). 
31.  Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485,
1488 (2011). 
32.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 242 (Dutton 1950) (1651) (quoted in Dan Simon, A
Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 40 (1998)). 
33.  Maroney, supra note 31, at 1488.
34.  Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 1071.  See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 
(1987) (defining legal formalism as “the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from 
premises accepted as authoritative”). 
6
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operate in the sacred sphere of our courts.  In the struggle for fairness, 
such contented disbelief is a very dangerous thing, particularly for 
judges whose very role it is to be unbiased and fair.”35  However much 
we may understand on an intellectual level that judges are mere humans, 
we have a tendency to believe that somehow the process of becoming a 
judge effects a substantial transformation, and that judges become 
different from the rest of us.  At least implicitly, we impute near-magical 
properties to the acts of taking an oath and donning a black robe, as if 
they somehow eliminate one’s susceptibility to all the foibles, biases, 
and petty jealousies that are the stuff of day-to-day life.  “Jerome Frank 
called this “the myth about the non-human-ness of judges.”36  However, 
in light of recent decisionmaking studies, this myth is being debunked.37  
Cognitive science explains that judicial decisionmaking is subject to a 
complex array of influences, both conscious and unconscious. 
To illustrate how cognitive shortcuts and biases affect 
decisionmaking, put yourself in the position of a trial judge and consider 
these three scenarios: 
1. Just before 11:00 p.m. on a weekday night, a police officer attempts
to pull over a car traveling at seventy-three miles per hour on a road 
with a fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit.38 The driver of the speed-
ing car initiates a high-speed chase lasting six minutes and nine miles, 
reaching speeds in excess of eighty-five miles per hour, and side-
swiping another car in the parking lot of a closed shopping mall.39 
During the chase, which was videotaped by a police in-car camera, po-
lice officers blocked off intersections to protect other motorists and to 
prevent the fleeing driver from entering residential neighborhoods;40 
video41 of the chase reflects that it did not pass any pedestrians, side-
walks, or residences.42  The pursuit ended when a deputy rammed into 
the driver’s rear bumper, causing him to spin out of control and crash.  
35.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 3.
36.  Chad M. Oldfather, Judges As Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of
Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 127 (2007) (quoting JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 147 (1949)); see United States v. Ballard, 322 
U.S. 78, 93-94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (pointing out that “dispassionate judges” are 
“mythical beings” like “Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies”). 
37.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 191, 193 (2012). 
38.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
39.  Id. at 375.
40.  Id. at 392-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41.  Scott, 550 U.S., Video Resources, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.rmvb. 
42.  Scott, 550 U.S. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7
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The driver suffered a broken neck that left him a quadriplegic.43 
Was the deputy’s use of deadly force to terminate the high-speed chase 
reasonable, so as to defeat a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?44 
2. On a daily basis, the plaintiff and other female employees encoun-
tered pictures of nude or partially clad women displayed by male 
coworkers in common work areas.45  One male coworker regularly 
made vulgar and obscene comments, and specifically remarked of the 
plaintiff, “All that bitch needs is a good lay,” and called her “fat ass.”46  
Unlike male salaried employees, the plaintiff did not receive free 
lunches, free gasoline, a telephone credit card, or entertainment privi-
leges, was not permitted to take male customers to lunch, nor was she 
invited to the company’s weekly golf matches. 
Was the harassment experienced by the plaintiff sufficiently severe or 
pervasive so as to alter the terms of her employment and create an 
abusive working environment?47 
3. On your way home from work in December, you pass by your
town’s municipal building and notice a nativity scene and a lighted 
menorah. 
Does this display reflect the town’s endorsement of religion? 
In reaching your conclusions about these situations, you may have 
struggled with questions such as When is a use of deadly force 
“reasonable”?, What makes a work environment “abusive”?, and What 
does it mean for a town to “endorse” religion?  These sorts of 
questions, as challenging as they may be, are encumbered in the law 
with an additional layer of difficulty.  That is, the law often requires a 
judge’s determination not of her own answers to these types of 
questions, but her assessment of how a “reasonable person” would 
answer them.  In certain contexts, such as rulings on motions for 
summary judgment or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, judges 
must determine whether any reasonable person could reach a particular 
conclusion. 
Is it possible that a “reasonable person’s” evaluation of the above 
scenarios would differ from your own?  Is it possible to fathom the 
perspective of a reasonable person, let alone distinguish it from your 
43.  Id. at 375-76.
44.  See id. at 376.
45.  Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J. dissenting).
46.  Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
47.  See Judge D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, Draft Pattern
Jury Instructions for Cases of Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment) 28 § 2.3 (2009). 
8
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own? 
The reasonable person is the “common law’s most enduring legal 
fiction.”48  In the context of negligence and criminal law, the reasonable 
person invokes a standard of ordinariness or normalcy.49  In 
discrimination and sexual harassment cases, the reasonable person can 
be understood as a neutral standard to correct for a judge’s own beliefs 
and attitudes.50  As described by Dean Prosser, the reasonable person 
standard has been carefully crafted to formulate one standard of conduct 
for society: 
The standard of conduct which the community demands must be an ex-
ternal and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or 
bad, of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same 
for all persons, since the law can have no favorites. . . . 
The courts have gone to unusual pains to emphasize the abstract and 
hypothetical character of this mythical person. He is not to be identi-
fied with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unrea-
sonable things; he is a prudent and careful person, who is always up to 
standard. . . .  [H]e is rather a personification of a community ideal of 
reasonable behavior, determined by the jury’s social judgment.51 
Despite its ubiquity in the law, critics have long asked whether the 
reasonable person standard is “simply a vehicle for judicial discretion.”52  
As Professor Alafair Burke commented, “absent statistical evidence 
establishing the empirical reality, all decision-makers—whether 
Supreme Court [J]ustices, law professors, or jurors—are tempted to 
substitute their own judgment of reasonableness both for the majority’s 
and for what is normatively ‘right.’”53 Put similarly, Linda Krieger and 
Susan Fiske have written, “[i]n discrimination cases, as elsewhere, 
judges are constantly using ‘intuitive’ or ‘common sense’ psychological 
theories in the construction and justification of legal doctrines and in 
their application to specific legal disputes.”54  These theories stem in part 
48.  Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2010).  See Victoria Nourse, After the 
Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 34 
(2008) (calling the “reasonable man” an “anthropomorphic institutional heuristic”). 
49.  Moran, supra note 48, at 1236.
50.  Id. at 1237.
51.  PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS (5th ed.), § 32, at 173-75.
52.  Moran, supra note 48, at 1234.
53.  Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1052
(2005). 
54.  Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2006). 
9
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from judges’ racial and gender identities and experiences.55  As of 2010, 
federal judges were 77 percent male and more than 80 percent white.56  
Fifty-one of the 165 active judges currently sitting on the thirteen federal 
courts of appeals are female (about 31 percent).57  Approximately 30 
percent of active U.S. district court judges are women.58  In state high 
courts, 87 percent of judges are white.59  In state trial courts, 86 percent 
of judges are white.60  Although juries may be more diverse, judges 
can—and often do—overturn jury verdicts or make pretrial rulings that 
prevent plaintiffs from taking their cases to a jury.  Therefore, 
understanding judicial decisionmaking is the key to understanding the 
outcome of particular cases and the development of law. 
In Part II, this Article will explore the cognitive science research 
regarding decisionmaking and implicit bias to reveal how each of us 
develops values, intuitions, and expectations below the level of our 
consciousness that powerfully affect both our perceptions and our 
judgments. Although there are many types of cognitive biases and 
heuristics involved in decisionmaking, for purposes of this Article, I 
focus on implicit biases towards various social groups.  “[E]xplicit” 
biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are consciously accessible 
through introspection and endorsed as appropriate.61  By contrast, 
“implicit” biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously 
accessible through introspection and are more likely to emerge during 
stressful situations or when someone is forced to make a decision in a 
short amount of time.  Many of these biases are pervasive and not in line 
with our beliefs.  If we find out that we have them, we may indeed reject 
them as inappropriate.62 
Part III will summarize recent studies regarding judges, cognitive 
illusions, and implicit bias to demonstrate that a judge’s past 
55.  Id. at 1004 (discussing growing scholarly concern with “uncontrolled application of . . .
subtle ingroup preferences”). 
56.  Calculations are based on data from the Biographical Directory of Judges, Federal
Judicial Center, U.S. Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2013). 
57.  Id.
58.  Id.
59.  ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, National Database on Judicial
Diversity in State Courts, ABA (June 2010), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm. 
60.  Id.
61.  Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012)
[hereinafter Kang, Courtroom]. 
62.  Id.
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/3
2014] JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 703 
experiences, prior assumptions, and resulting cognitive schemas, or 
cognitive shortcuts, do influence her decisionmaking, whether or not she 
is aware of it.  Certainly, attempting to analyze what sort of process is 
“really” going on when a judge makes a determination is “a confounding 
and complicated endeavor.”63  “Deciding any given case likely requires a 
judge to rely on a combination of different abilities and knowledge 
including a firm understanding of rules of law, statutes, and precedent; 
an appreciation for legal theory and policy; and an incorporation of 
common sense and judgment informed by an empathetic understanding 
of context.”64  Although cognitive science cannot provide a 
comprehensive understanding of how judges make decisions,65 it does 
explain one piece, albeit a very important one, of the process.  My aim is 
to shed some light on one aspect of judicial decisionmaking and offer a 
theory of how to improve upon those decisions by recognizing and then 
countering implicit biases that have been demonstrated to corrupt 
judgment.66 
In light of the cognitive science research, Part IV proposes the tool 
of judicial empathy to mitigate the inevitable implicit biases each judge 
brings to the bench.  I join the scholars who argue that empathy, 
perspective-taking, or actively imagining the world from another’s 
vantage point, is a valuable part of decisionmaking.67  Empathizing does 
not necessarily mean ruling in one’s favor; rather, it demonstrates a 
judge’s consideration of both parties’ perspectives, appreciation for their 
situation, and understanding of the decision’s lasting impact. 
Part V discusses judicial empathy in the context of Fourth 
63.  Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2109 (1989). 
64.  Id.  See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 29, at 117.  Posner argues that when
confronted with legal questions lacking determinative answers judges need to consult “good 
judgment,” which he defines as “an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, 
modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human limitations, sanity, 
prudence, a sense of reality and common sense.” 
65.  See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 2 (1997) (“Judicial behavior
presents a complex puzzle.”). 
66.  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969,
992 (2008) (“[W]e believe that implicit bias is a serious problem and that it is exceedingly 
important for the law to attempt to address implicitly biased behavior.”).  See also Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 469 (1987), aff’d in relevant part 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  (“Unwitting or 
ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradication than blatant or calculated 
discrimination.”). 
67.  E.g., Professor Susan Bandes has been prolific in exhorting the value of empathy in
judicial decisionmaking.  See Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 
1, 10 (2011) [hereinafter Bandes, Moral Imagination].  See also, Catherine Gage O’Grady, Empathy 
and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4 (2001). 
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Amendment, discrimination, criminal, and Establishment Clause cases in 
which courts apply reasonableness standards.  As Professor Robin West 
argues, “the ability to understand the goals of others is of the essence of 
the art of judging.”68  The cases discussed in Part V illustrate that a 
judge’s work requires a capacity to understand the challenges faced by a 
wide range of potential litigants from across the spectrum of our 
society.69  Judges who make no attempt to exercise empathy and “are 
likely to assume that their own perspective is universal, rather than to 
make the imaginative effort to understand what motivates others,” are 
“mind-blind.”70  Judges who are unable to assess problems from any 
vantage point other than their own may not be capable of administering 
justice equally and impartially. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that “[a] fair trial in a 
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”71  Fundamental to 
the notion of a fair trial and tribunal is the principle that a judge shall 
apply the law impartially and free from the influence of any personal 
biases.72  However, judges disserve themselves and the system if they 
presume that bias and prejudice do not enter the decisionmaking process 
to some degree.  As Jerome Frank observed, “to recognize the existence 
of such prejudices is a part of wisdom.”73  A discussion of implicit bias 
and empathy is significant because “[s]o long as we cling to half-truths 
about the judicial function, we render irrelevant otherwise important 
questions about judges and judging, and we forgo pursuit of ‘the needed 
corrective of an ideal of impossible objectivity.’”74 
68.  Robin West, Law and Fancy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1851, 1857 (1997).
69.  See O’Grady, supra note 67, at 5-6 (describing the process of incorporating empathy in
decisionmaking). 
From disgruntled employees to disenfranchised schoolchildren, from World War II vets 
to homosexual government workers, Canby listens to them and hears them.  That is not 
to say that the poor or disenfranchised always receive Canby’s favorable vote—they do 
not.  But it does mean that he will attempt seriously to appreciate the human context of 
their situation while applying legal rules and principles to the task of deciding their dis-
pute.  He appreciates the importance of their perspective and he seems to understand that 
an important part of his job is to try, to the best of his ability, to imagine their situations. 
Id. at 5-6. 
70.  Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 67, at 9-10. 
71.  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (the Constitution requires that hearings take
place before an impartial tribunal); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 512 (1926) (“A trial before a 
tribunal financially interested in the result of its decision constitutes a denial of due process of 
law.”). 
72.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 3.
73.  JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 414
(1949). 
74.  CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 168-69.
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II. COGNITION AND DECISIONMAKING
Scientists who study human reasoning across a range of cognitive 
domains such as learning, decisionmaking, and social cognition, have 
increasingly converged on the idea that reasoning occurs via a “dual 
process.”75  According to such approaches, people employ two cognitive 
systems.76  System 1 is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; System 2 is 
more deliberative, calculative, slower, and often more likely to be error-
free.77  Many implicit mental processes function outside of one’s 
conscious focus and are rooted in System 1, including implicit 
memories, implicit perceptions, implicit attitudes, and implicit 
stereotypes.78  System 1 mental processes affect social judgments, but 
operate without conscious awareness or conscious control.79  “These 
implicit thoughts and feelings leak into everyday behaviors such as 
whom we befriend, whose work we value, and whom we favor—
notwithstanding our obliviousness to any such influence.”80  Thus, 
“actors do not always have conscious, intentional control over the 
processes of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that 
motivate their actions.”81  According to Nobel Prize–winning economist 
and psychologist Daniel Kahneman, 
When asked what you are thinking about, you can normally answer.  
You believe you know what goes on in your mind, which often con-
sists of one thought leading in an orderly way to another.  But that is 
not the only way the mind works, nor indeed is that the typical way. 
Most impressions and thoughts arise in your conscious experience 
without your knowing how they got there. You cannot trace how you 
came to the belief that there is a lamp on the desk in front of you, or 
how you detected a hint of irritation in your spouse’s voice on the tele-
phone, or how you managed to avoid a threat on the road before you 
75.  See generally, DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
76.  Id.
77.  Id. at 20-22; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 975. 
78.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 974. 
79.  Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 467 (2010).  Implicit social cognition (“ISC”) is a field of psychology that 
examines the mental processes that affect social judgments but operate without conscious awareness 
or conscious control.  See generally Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social 
Cognition and Law, in 3 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 427 (2007).  The term was first used and 
defined by Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji.  See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. 
Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 
(1995). 
80.  Kang & Lane, supra note 79, at 467-68.
81.  Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006). 
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became consciously aware of it.82 
Implicit bias can be understood in light of existing analyses of System 1 
processes.83  Implicit biases are unconscious mental processes based on 
implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes that are formed by one’s life 
experiences and that lurk beneath the surface of the conscious.84  They 
are automatic; the characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual 
orientation) operates so quickly in the relevant tests, that people have no 
time to deliberate.85  It is for this reason that people are often surprised to 
find that they show implicit bias.  Indeed, many people say in good faith 
that they are fully committed to an antidiscrimination principle with 
respect to the very trait against which they show a bias.86  Although 
System 2 articulates judgments and makes choices, it often endorses or 
rationalizes ideas and feelings that were generated by System 1.87  It is 
also “not a paragon of rationality,” but is limited by available knowledge 
based on past experiences.88 
Implicit biases are rooted in the fundamental mechanics of the 
human thought process, where people learn at an early age to associate 
items that commonly go together and to logically expect them to 
inevitably co-exist in other settings: “thunder and rain, for instance, or 
gray hair and old age.”89  The tendency to associate related concepts 
with each other and the ability to answer questions such as “What is it?,” 
“How does it work?,” “Why is it here?,” and “What will it do?”90 is 
understood through categories and “cognitive structures” called 
82.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 75, at 4. 
83.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 975. 
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
86.  Id.
In a post–civil rights era, in what some people exuberantly embrace as a post-racial era, 
many assume that we already live in a colorblind society . . . that [we] have learned well 
from Martin Luther King, Jr. and now judge people only on the content of their charac-
ter, not by their social categories.  In other words, we see through colorblind lenses.  
This convenient story is, however, disputed. . . .  We now have accumulated hard data, 
collected from scientific experiments, with all their mathematical precisions, objective 
measurements, and statistical dissections—for better and worse.  The data force us to see 
through the facile assumptions of colorblindness. 
Kang & Lane, supra note 79, at 519-20. 
87.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 75, at 415 (explaining that “You may not know that you are
optimistic about a project because something about its leader reminds you of your beloved sister, or 
you dislike a person who looks vaguely like your dentist.”). 
88.  Id.
89.  Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)Ethical Are You?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2003, at
58. 
90.  Chen & Hanson, supra note 5, at 1131. 
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schemas.91  These schemas are “mental blueprints” that allow an 
individual to understand new people, circumstances, objects, and their 
relationships to each other by using an existing framework of stored 
knowledge based on prior experiences.92  To simplify the complex flood 
of information from the world, we tend to categorize objects, people, and 
occurrences into groups, types, or categories—that is, into schemas—so 
that we can treat non-identical stimuli as if they were equivalent.  
Humans sort objects, people, and occurrences according to similarities in 
their essential features, forming natural mental categories about “kinds” 
or “types” of guns, men, women, parties, etc.  Schemas allow us to 
structure and give coherence to our general knowledge about people and 
the social world, providing expectations about typical patterns of events 
and behavior and the range of likely differences between people and 
their characteristic attributes.93  Put another way, these mental blueprints 
sort our experiences and acquired knowledge of the world and organize 
them into categories that function like containers.94  But for these 
containers, our ideas would be scattered like marbles on the floor.95 
Schemas are cognitive shortcuts allowing us to comprehend new 
situations and ideas without having to draw inferences and to understand 
relationships for the first time.96  When we see or think of a concept, the 
schema is activated unconsciously.  The schema brings to mind other 
information that we associate with the original concept.  “We may 
automatically infer people’s character from their behavior, automatically 
experience affective reactions to a variety of objects, automatically 
behave in line with traits cued by recent experiences, and automatically 
engage in a variety of other mental processes as well.”97  For example, if 
an individual is introduced as a professor, a “professor schema” may be 
activated and we might associate this person with wisdom or authority, 
or past experiences of a professor. 
“Schemas influence every feature of human cognition, affecting not 
only what information receives attention, but also how that information 
91.  Id. (quoting Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information
Processing, in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 89, 114-15 (E. Tory Higgins et al. 
eds., 1981)). 
92.  Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681,
700 (1994). 
93.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 10.
94.  Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making:
A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009). 
95.  Id. at 265.
96.  Id.
97.  KUNDA, supra note 2, at 265-88. 
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is categorized, what inferences are drawn from it, and what is or is not 
remembered.”98  People have schemas for everything, including schemas 
for ourselves (self-schemas), for other people (people schemas), roles 
people assume (role schemas),99 and event schemas, or scripts, which 
help us to understand how a process, or event, occurs.100  Self-schemas 
contain our knowledge and expectations about our own traits.101  Person 
schemas represent knowledge structures about characteristics, behaviors, 
and goals of other individuals.102  We classify individuals based on their 
characteristics and the inferences we make based on those traits.103  Role 
schemas help to organize our knowledge about “the set of behaviors 
expected of a person in a particular social position, and like person 
schemas, role schemas help us to make sense of and predict people’s 
characteristics and behaviors.”104  When we encounter a person, we 
classify that person into numerous social categories, such as gender, 
(dis)ability, age, race, and role.105  For example, people develop racial 
schemas which trigger implicit and explicit emotions, feelings, positive 
or negative evaluations, and thoughts or beliefs about the racial category, 
such as generalizations about their intelligence or criminality.106  
Because our individual experiences create our schemas, each person’s 
script for a particular situation may be different.  People consciously and 
unconsciously draw on their knowledge, creating different cognitive 
frames that produce “different information” about the same event.107  
Scripts not only function as cognitive shortcuts that provide meaning to 
a set of events, but they also reinforce traditional cultural and societal 
98.  Chen & Hanson, supra note 5, at 1131. 
99.  Id. at 1133.
 100.  Id. at 1137.  Scripts are in some ways like recipes—helping us interpret both the things 
we see and the things we do not see.  If we observe a person paying a bill and leaving a restaurant, a 
restaurant script triggers a knowledge of earlier events that have happened: The customer has 
ordered, been served, and eaten food.  Id. at 1139. 
101.  Id. at 1134. 
102.  Id. at 1135. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 1137. 
105.  Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005) [hereinafter 
Kang, Trojan Horses]. 
106.  Id. 
 107.  See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118 
(2008) (explaining how white and black observers would perceive differently a scenario in which an 
African-American family is seated near the back of the restaurant and for ten minutes, the parents 
attempt to get the waiter’s attention to ask for menus and to order food).  Professor Robinson 
predicts that white participants would likely state that they did not consider that the placement of the 
family’s table might have a racial correlation, while black observers might fill in the informational 
gaps with the assistance of a schema, such as, “fancy restaurants in suburbs are likely to be a site of 
discrimination against black customers.”  Id. at 1118-19. 
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values.  When an individual’s cognitive mind unconsciously selects a 
script within which to interpret the situation, that individual’s judgments 
will be based on the assumptions derived from the social knowledge 
embedded in the script rather than on the unique characteristics of the 
particular situation.108 
For example, studies have proven perceptual differences of certain 
situations among racial groups and between men and women.  One such 
study was conducted by the Heldrich Center for Workplace 
Development at Rutgers University which interviewed 3,000 employees 
on various workplace equality issues.109  Half of the African-American 
respondents said that “African-Americans are treated unfairly in the 
workplace,” while just 10 percent of white respondents agreed with that 
statement.110  Thirteen percent of nonblack people of color shared this 
perception.111  There is also evidence from polls, while mixed, which 
generally suggests that men and women perceive discrimination 
differently.  For example, in 2005, 45 percent of women (and 61 percent 
of men) said women had equal job opportunities.112 
Understanding “biases” as automatic cognitive shortcuts reveals 
that the term need not have a pejorative connotation, but rather, “can be 
either favorable or unfavorable.”113  Our decisions are influenced by “a 
long litany of biases,” most of them unrelated to gender, ethnicity, or 
race.114  For example, we are inclined to “anchor” numbers, judgments, 
or assessments that we have been exposed to and use them as a starting 
point for future judgments, regardless of their accuracy.115  We also 
suffer from “hindsight bias” and look back at events to overestimate the 
predictability of those events given our current knowledge.116  A self-
serving bias inclines us to make inflated judgments about ourselves, our 
abilities, or our beliefs.117 
108.  Berger, supra note 94, at 299. 
 109.  Robinson, supra note 107, at 1107 (citing K.A. Dixon, Duke Storen & Carl E. Van Horn, 
John J. Heldrich Ctr. for Workplace Dev., Rutgers Univ., A Workplace Divided: How Americans 
View Discrimination and Race on the Job 5 (2002), 
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/uploadedFiles/Publications/ Work_Trends_020107.pdf). 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. 
112.  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Gender Differences in Views of Job Opportunity, GALLUP POLL 
NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 2, 2005), http:// www.gallup.com/poll/17614/Gender-Differences-Views-Job-
Opportunity.aspx. 
113.  Id. at 951. 
114.  Kang, Courtroom, supra note 61, at 1128. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 75, at 436-37. 
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One type of bias is affected by our attitudes and stereotypes 
regarding social categories, such as genders, ethnicities, and races.118  
An attitude is an association between some concept, such as a social 
group, and a positive or negative valence.119  Prejudice can be defined as 
an association between social objects developed from memory and 
positive or negative valence.120  Similarly, stereotypes are associations 
developed from experience between concepts, such as social groups, and 
attributes.121  In each case, the associations are automatically accessed in 
the presence of objects.122 
As with other schemas, stereotypes can facilitate the rapid 
categorization of people and allow us to “save cognitive resources.”123  
As Daniel Kahneman and his long-time collaborator, Amos Tversky, 
observed in their early work on heuristics, intuitive thinking is “quite 
useful.”124  Some behavioral scientists suggest that schemas allow judges 
in an overburdened legal system to identify important facts and 
distinguish relevant from irrelevant information.125 Without the use of 
schemas, each new case would demand significantly more of a judge’s 
attention and time.126 
However, researchers explain that “the price we pay for such 
efficiency is bias in our perceptions and judgments,”127 and intuition is 
also the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, like the race, 
gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.  It will be 
extremely difficult for the individual to deviate from what the script has 
taught her about the world because the outcome suggested by the script 
will seem to be a natural result of precedent events.128  There is evidence 
that people pay more attention to information that is consistent with a 
stereotype and less attention to stereotype-inconsistent information, that 
118.  Kang, Courtroom, supra note 61, at 1128. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, 
Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129, 133 (2004). 
121.  Id.; Kang, Courtroom, supra note 61, at 1128. 
122.  Rudman, supra note 120, at 133. 
123.  Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 367 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).  See also C. Neil Macrae & 
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About Others, 51 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2000) (“In attempting to make sense of other people, we regularly construct and 
use categorical representations to simplify and streamline the person perception process.”). 
124.  Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124. 
125.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 10. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 11. 
128.  Berger, supra note 94, at 265. 
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people seek out information that is consistent with the stereotype, and 
that people are better able to remember information that is consistent 
with the stereotype.129 
Stereotypes are resistant to change because our perceptions become 
impervious to new information.130  When we discover evidence that 
supports our desired conclusions, we readily accept it, but when we 
come across comparable evidence that challenges our desired 
conclusions, we “work hard to refute it.”131  “[W]e see what we expect to 
see.  Like well-accepted theories that guide our interpretation of data, 
schemas incline us to interpret data consistent with our biases.”132  
Furthermore, because people are naïve realists in the sense that they 
generally assume that they see the world as it is in objective reality, a 
person will assume that other objective perceivers will share her views 
about oneself and the world.133  When other people do not share 
someone’s views, one first questions whether the people lack essential 
information and, having ruled out that possibility, one concludes that 
others must be biased.134 
Eric Uhlmann and Geoffrey Cohen have demonstrated that when a 
person believes himself to be objective, such belief licenses him to act 
on his biases.135  In one study, Uhlmann and Cohen had participants 
choose either a candidate, “Gary” or “Lisa,” for the job of factory 
manager.  Both candidate profiles, comparable on all traits, 
unambiguously showed strong organizational skills but weak 
interpersonal skills.136  Half the participants were primed to view 
themselves as objective and the other half were left alone as a control 
group.137  This was done by asking participants to rate their own 
objectivity.138  More than 88 percent of the participants rated themselves 
as above average on objectivity.139  Those in the control condition gave 
the male and female candidates statistically indistinguishable hiring 
129.  Fiske, supra note 123, at 371. 
 130.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 11 (citing RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN 
INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 113-38 (1980)). 
131.  KUNDA, supra note 2, at 230.  
132.  Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 105, at 1515. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Kang, Courtroom, supra note 61, at 1173. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. (citing Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: 
Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007)). 
138.  Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 137, at 210-11. 
139.  See id. at 209. 
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evaluations.140  However, those who were manipulated to think of 
themselves as objective evaluated the male candidates more highly.141  
The result was not because of any difference in the candidates’ merit.  
Instead, the discrimination was a result of disparate evaluation, in which 
“Gary” was rated as more interpersonally skilled than “Lisa” by those 
primed to think of themselves objective.142  Ironically, it seems that 
thinking of oneself to be objective leads one to be more susceptible to 
biases.143 
Regardless of conscious and explicit desires for unbiased 
decisionmaking, implicit biases “can produce behavior that diverges 
from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.”144  Today, the 
overwhelming majority of judges in America explicitly reject the idea 
that race or gender should influence litigants’ treatment in court, but 
even the most egalitarian among us may harbor invidious mental 
associations.145  For example, most white adults are more likely to 
associate African-Americans than white Americans with violence,146 and 
most Americans are more likely to associate women with family life 
than with professional careers.147 
A now-famous example of social cognition research on implicit 
racial bias comes from Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald, and their 
colleagues, who began using the IAT in the 1990s.148  The IAT pairs an 
attitude object, such as a racial group, with an evaluative dimension, 
good or bad, and tests how response accuracy and speed indicate implicit 
and automatic attitudes and stereotypes.149  For example, in one task, 
140.  See id. at 210-11. 
141.  See id. at 211. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Kang, Courtroom, supra note 61 at 1173.  People also view others as being more biased 
than themselves by the ideology of their political in-groups.  Emily Pronin, Perception and 
Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2007). 
144.  Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 81, at 951. 
 145.  See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 105, at 1512-14 (reviewing the evidence on implicit 
invidious associations). 
146.  See id. at 1515 n.117. 
147.  See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006) (“[S]eventy-five percent of men and 
women do not associate female with career as easily as they associate female to family.”). 
 148.  Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1478 (1998); Greenwald & 
Banaji, supra note 79. 
 149.  Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354-355 (2007) (citing Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes 
Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 
117, 123 (2001)). 
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participants are told to quickly pair together pictures of African-
American faces with positive words from the evaluative dimension.150  
The strength of the attitude or stereotype is determined by the speed at 
which the participant pairs the words.151  The results from hundreds of 
thousands of IATs taken on the IAT project’s website expose systematic 
implicit racial biases.152 
In general, results of the IAT reveal that: 
• Implicit biases are pervasive.  They appear as statistically
“large” effects that are often shown by majorities of
samples of Americans. . . .
• People are often unaware of their implicit biases.  Ordinary
people, including the researchers who direct this project,
are found to harbor . . . implicit biases . . . even while
honestly . . . reporting that they regard themselves as
lacking these biases.
• Implicit biases predict behavior. . . .  [T]hose who are
higher in implicit bias have been shown to display greater
discrimination. . . .153
There is increasing evidence that implicit biases, as measured by the 
IAT, predict behavior in the real world.154  Among the findings from 
various laboratories are that implicit bias predicts the rate of callback 
interviews;155 implicit bias predicts awkward body language which could 
influence whether folks feel that they are being treated fairly or 
courteously;156 implicit bias predicts how we read the friendliness of 
150.  Id. at 345. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Clear evidence of the pervasiveness of implicit bias comes from Project Implicit, a 
research website operated by research scientists, technicians, and laboratories at Harvard University, 
Washington University, and the University of Virginia.  About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
http://www.projectimplicit.net/about.php.  
 153.  Bennett, supra note 26, at 153.  Empirical evidence from other social science studies also 
shows that implicit bias is pervasive in our society.  See e.g. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and 
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 
(1989). 
 154.  Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer for Courts, Prepared for the National Campaign to 
Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s State Courts, 1, 4 (2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/u
nit_3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Kang, Primer]. 
 155.  Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence, 5 (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007) (based on implicit stereotype in Sweden that 
Arabs are lazy). 
 156.  Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, 
Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 435 (2001). 
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facial expressions;157 implicit bias predicts more negative evaluations of 
ambiguous actions by an African-American;158 and implicit bias predicts 
more negative evaluations of agentic (i.e., confident, aggressive, 
ambitious) women in certain hiring conditions.159 
III. HOW JUDGES MAKE DECISIONS
A recent approach to studying judicial decisionmaking proposes an 
“intuitive-override” model of judging that applies key insights from 
cognitive science, as explained in Part I.160  This model posits that 
judges generally make intuitive decisions, which occur spontaneously 
and involve decisions that are made automatically, effortlessly, and 
quickly.161  Judges can sometimes override their intuition with 
deliberative thought processes, which occur through controlled 
processing and involve decisions that are rule-governed and made 
slowly with great effort.162  The relationship between intuitive thought 
processes and deliberative thought processes is complicated, and judicial 
decisionmaking can certainly be seen to involve both types of thought 
processes.163  Although it may seem that judges, by virtue of their 
educations, experience, and commitment to impartiality, are immune 
from implicit biases, a new study suggests that “people with none of 
these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive 
sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to 
bias.  If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher 
cognitive ability.”164 
In a groundbreaking series of studies on judicial decisionmaking, 
two law professors and a United States magistrate judge studied whether 
 157.  Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the 
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640 (2003). 
 158.  Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to 
Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133 (2002). 
 159.  Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward 
Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743 (2001). 
 160.  Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie, Blinking]. 
161.  Id. at 3, 7. 
162.  Id. at 7-8. 
163.  See id. at 2-3 (“Judges surely rely on intuition, rendering a purely formalist model of 
judging clearly wrong, yet they also appear able to apply legal rules to facts, similarly disproving a 
purely realist model of judging.”). 
 164.  Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate the Bias Blind Spot, 
103 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 506 (2012) (concluding that “[t]he cognitive primitiveness of 
some of the processes causing the bias blind spot might be consistent with the failure of intelligence 
to attenuate the bias.”). 
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trial court judges primarily engage in deliberative judging or intuitive 
decisionmaking.165  The results of a three-question Cognitive Reflection 
Test (“CRT”) to 252 Florida trial court judges166 suggest that judges rely 
heavily on their intuition, not only when they confront generic problems 
like the problems included in the CRT, but also when they face typical 
functions of their jobs, such as awarding damages, assessing liability 
based on statistical evidence, and predicting outcomes on appeal.167  
Other studies168 by the same authors suggest that even though judges are 
experienced, well-trained, and highly motivated decision-makers, they 
are influenced by cognitive blinders, such as anchoring, hindsight bias, 
and self-serving bias, when deciding traditional problems from the 
bench.169 
In another study, Guthrie and his co-authors questioned whether 
“judges, who are professionally committed to egalitarian norms, hold 
[the] same implicit biases” as most other Americans.170  Based on their 
study involving 133 elected and appointed judges from various 
jurisdictions, the authors found “that judges harbor the same kinds of 
implicit biases as others; that these biases can influence their judgment; 
but that given sufficient motivation, judges can compensate for the 
influence of these biases.”171 
Similarly, a recent law review article concludes that implicit bias 
causes judges and jurors to unknowingly misremember case facts in 
racially biased ways.172  This article draws upon a wide array of studies 
into implicit social cognition, human memory, and legal 
165.  See Guthrie, Blinking, supra note 160. 
 166.  The CRT’s three questions are: (1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total.  The bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball.  How much does the ball cost?  (2) If it takes five machines five minutes 
to make five widgets, how long would it take one hundred machines to make one hundred widgets?  
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size.  If it takes forty-
eight days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of 
the lake?  Id. at 10. 
167.  Id. at 27. 
168.  See Guthrie, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 1, at 786. In an empirical study 
designed to determine whether five common cognitive illusions (anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, 
the representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases) would influence the decisionmaking 
processes of a sample of 167 federal magistrate judges, although the judges appeared somewhat less 
susceptible to two of these illusions (framing effects and the representativeness heuristic) than lay 
decision-makers, each of the five illusions tested had a significant impact on judicial 
decisionmaking. 
169.  Guthrie, supra note 18, at 430-40. 
170.  Rachlinski, Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
1195. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Levinson, supra note 149, at 391-95. 
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decisionmaking.173  The researcher conducted an empirical study “to 
examine whether people’s recollections of legal stories are shaped by the 
race of the actors in the stories.”174  He found that systematic and 
implicit stereotype-driven memory errors affect legal decisionmaking 
and that the nature of group deliberations appears unlikely to alter this 
phenomenon.175 
In another recent study, researchers tested whether judges’ personal 
backgrounds affect their case outcomes.176  Researchers analyzed 522 
motions for summary judgment decided by 431 federal district court 
judges in employment civil rights cases.177  The study concluded that 
when judges hear cases brought by plaintiffs who are of “the same 
minority status as the judge, the cases survive motions for summary 
judgment at a much higher rate. . .”178  There was “a 47.28 percent 
difference between white and minority judges who adjudicate claims 
involving minority plaintiffs, and roughly a 50 percent difference 
between white and minority judges who adjudicate claims involving 
white plaintiffs.”179 
The findings suggest that judges possess a set of beliefs or opinions 
that predispose them to rule in accordance with those beliefs or 
opinions.180  The danger of implicit biases affecting decisions is greatest 
in the “open areas” in judging, where the law does not clearly compel a 
result and a judge cannot predictably find an answer in the law.  Thus, a 
judge then has a “blank slate” to make a choice, to fill the open area. 181  
In these areas a judge decides how the facts of a case fit together or 
decides what effect an existing rule should have in a new context.  Thus, 
when a trial judge listens to conflicting testimony in a hearing, the 
manner in which the judge processes that testimony and resolves 
testimonial conflicts will be influenced by the blinders the judge 
possesses.  Similarly, a trial judge’s personal experiences and 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. at 390. 
175.  Id. at 391-95. 
176.  Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, 
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 318-19 (2012). 
177.  Id. at 333. 
 178.  Id. at 343.  “For example, when a white judge decides a case involving a white plaintiff, 
the plaintiff’s case (or some portion of it) has a 40 percent predicted probability of surviving a 
motion for summary judgment.  When a white judge adjudicates a case involving a minority 
plaintiff, however, the predicted probability of the plaintiff’s case surviving summary judgment 
drops to roughly 34.43 percent.”  Id. 
179.  Id. at 344. 
180.  Id. at 340. 
181.  POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 9. 
182.  Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their 
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perspectives will likely influence her application of uncertain law to 
conflicting facts”182  The researchers concluded that “[e]ven if judges 
have no bias or prejudice against either litigant, fully understand the 
relevant law, and know all of the relevant facts, they might still make 
systematically erroneous decisions under some circumstances simply 
because of how they—like all human beings—think.”183  While not 
explicitly discussing implicit bias, Guthrie and his co-authors observed, 
“[I]ntuition is also the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, 
like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal 
system,” and that intuitive associations, for example, of African-
Americans with violence, “seem to reflect automatic, intuitive 
judgments, while active deliberation limits such biases.”184  “[I]t may 
well be that the more unclear the law or the facts are, the more likely it 
will be that judge’s decisions will be influenced by the judge’s 
blinders.”185  As Judge Bennett explains, “[t]hese findings are deeply 
troubling not only for our legal profession, but also for society as a 
whole.  While I was surprised by the results of my own IAT, these 
general findings show that virtually none of us, despite our best efforts, 
is free from implicit bias.”186 
In most cases that reach the highest levels of our judicial system, 
there is “no escape from choice in judging.”187  “The way a judge looks 
at the world, as informed by her experiences and affinities, can and will 
be a part of the choices she makes in these moments, along with her 
knowledge of doctrine and the support it lends to one choice or another, 
her “situation sense” about the case, and a number of other factors.”188  
“Discretion-free” judging, devoid of the influence of one’s identity or 
experiences, is implausible, in a profession populated by human beings, 
and not machines.”189  Judges across the centuries have explained that 
when judging entails “construing or extending law,”190 a judge invokes 
 182.  Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their 
Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 531 (2007). 
183.  Guthrie, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 1, at 829. 
184.  Guthrie, Blinking, supra note 160, at 31. 
185.  Uphoff, supra note 182, at 531. 
186.  Bennett, supra note 26, at 153-54.  “The findings of real-world consequence are 
disturbing for all of us who sincerely believe that we do not let biases prevalent in our culture infect 
our individual decisionmaking.  Even a little bit.”  Kang, Primer, supra note 154. 
187.  Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 91 (2002). 
 188.  Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 263, 270 (2010) [hereinafter Abrams, Empathy and Experience]. 
189.  Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empathy, and the Role of a Judge: The 
Senate Confirmation Hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 14 (2009). 
190.  CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 140. 
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her “individual sentiment of justice,”191 and experiences a hunch192 or 
intuition.193  Judge Cardozo identified one’s “compelling sentiment of 
justice” as one of the guideposts that might “come to the rescue of the 
anxious judge, and tell him where to go” when the law fails fully to do 
so.194  He explained that one’s ability to make the close calls—”to know 
when one interest outweighs another”—comes “from experience and 
study and reflection; in brief, from life itself.”195  Justice Holmes agreed, 
famously stating that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”196  For Justice Thurgood Marshall, a “personal history of 
exposure to the indignities and dangers of racism” resulted in his “vision 
of justice.”197  Justice Alito also acknowledged the role of experience in 
adjudication during his confirmation hearing. 
[W]hen a case comes before me involving, let’s say, someone who is 
an immigrant . . . I can’t help but think of my own ancestors because it 
wasn’t that long ago when they were in that position.  And so it’s my 
job to apply the law.  It’s not my job to change the law or to bend the 
law to achieve any results, but I have to, when I look at those cases, I 
have to say to myself, and I do say to myself, this could be your grand-
father.198 
He also stated, 
When I have cases involving children, I can’t help but think of my own 
children . . .  When I get a case about discrimination, I have to think 
about people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of 
their ethnic background or because of religion or because of gender, 
and I do take that into account.199 
Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg drew from her experience as a 
191.  Id. 
 192.  See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in 
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).  As Jerome Frank put it, if judicial decisions 
are “based on judge’s hunches, then the way in which the judge gets his hunches is the key to the 
judicial process.  Whatever produces the judge’s hunches makes the law.”  JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND 104 (1930). 
193.  POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 29, at 107. 
194.  CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 43. 
195.  Id. at 113. 
196.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1963). 
197.  Vicki C. Jackson, Remembering Justice Thurgood Marshall: Thoughts from His Clerks, 1 
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 8, 11 (1993). 
 198.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 475 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing]. 
199.  Id. 
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female when writing her dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co.,200 in which she noted that women who have been in the workforce 
understand that it can often take a period of years before one recognizes 
that one is being underpaid in relation to one’s colleagues.201 
The danger of schematic thinking is that a judge “cannot easily 
distinguish between what ‘the law says’ and what [he] believes. . . .”202  
He, therefore, “may not know how much [he] is (or should be) 
investigating what legal sources say, and how much [he] is applying 
[his] own ideals.”203  Because perception is subjective and influenced by 
a multitude of factors, when making a decision judges often face 
difficulty identifying the accurate and relevant facts.204  For example, 
judges may unconsciously process only that information that conforms 
to their preexisting cultural and social biases.205  Consequently, biased 
judicial decisionmaking becomes detrimental to the justice system when 
the “investigation is so difficult that judges must use intuitions and 
short-cuts, or when there is an unclear boundary between questions 
having correct answers and those left to the values of judges.”206  As 
Judge Kozinski explained, 
We all view reality from our own peculiar perspective; we all have bi-
ases, interests, leanings, instincts.  These are important.  Frequently, 
something will bother you about a case that you can’t quite put into 
words, will cause you to doubt the apparently obvious result.  It is im-
portant to follow those instincts, because they can lead to a crucial is-
sue that turns out to make a difference.  But it is even more important 
to doubt your own leanings, to be skeptical of your instincts.  It is fre-
quently very difficult to tell the difference between how you think a 
case should be decided and how you hope it will come out.  It is very 
easy to take sides in a case and subtly shade the decision-making pro-
cess in favor of the party you favor, much like the Legal Realists pre-
dict.  My prescription is not, however, to yield to these impulses with 
 200.  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Congress responded to this decision with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
which amended Title VII to provide that 180-day statute of limitations for filing claims based on 
pay discrimination resets with each new discriminatory paycheck.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 29 
and 42 of the United States Code). 
201.  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645. 
 202.  John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 
262 (1987). 
203.  Id. 
204.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 6. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Leubsdorf, supra note 202, at 266. 
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abandon, but to fight them.  If you, as a judge, find yourself too happy 
with the result in a case, stop and think.  Is that result justified by the 
law, fairly and honestly applied to the facts?  Or is it merely a bit of 
self-indulgence?207 
As Judge Posner explains, using intuition is inevitable and “compelled 
by the institutional structure of adjudication.”208  Judges make hundreds, 
if not thousands, of judicial decisions in the course of a year, and they 
have not the time before or after casting votes to engage in “elaborate 
analytical procedures.”209  They make decisions under uncertain, time-
pressured conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that 
sometimes cause illusions of judgment.  Appellate judges read parties’ 
briefs, discuss the case with law clerks, listen to oral arguments, and 
immediately after, briefly discuss the case with their colleagues, and take 
a tentative vote that usually turns out to be final.210  Given the time 
constraints, which are more severe for trial judges, at every stage of the 
decisionmaking process, “a judge’s reasoning is primarily intuitive.”211  
Even though a judicial opinion can serve as a check on these intuitions, 
by explaining how the judge arrived at the decision, it is an “imperfect 
check” because the vote deciding the legal issue is cast before the 
opinion is written and most judges do not treat the vote as a hypothesis 
to be proven by research.212  Rather, the research is a search to support 
the conclusion.213  We know that perceptions based upon intuition, 
personal background, or previous experiences “are unreliable grounds” 
for judicial decisionmaking.214 
For example, when deciding motions to dismiss, trial judges must 
be aware of how their schemas and heuristics operate.  In deciding 
whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a district judge 
must decide whether the pleadings contain “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”215  Thus, a claim is facially 
 207.  Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision 
Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 997-98 (1993). 
208.  POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 29, at 110. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id.  This search for support for a pre-determined conclusion is evidence of the well-
documented confirmation bias which is a tendency for a person to search for information that 
“confirms, rather than contradicts one’s initial judgment . . .”  Id. at 111. 
214. Id. at 75. 
 215.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court 
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“plausible” only when a plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to allow the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
alleged misconduct.216  In any civil case in federal court, “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”217  Instead, the plaintiff must 
support legal conclusions with “well-pleaded factual allegations.”218  
These allegations must be taken as true, but, even then, scrutinized to see 
whether “they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”219  Whether 
such facts give rise to a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific 
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.”220 
Applying this standard, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court dismissed 
Javaid Iqbal’s Bivens action against John Ashcroft, the former Attorney 
General, and Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI.221  Iqbal, a Muslim 
Pakistani, who was held in a maximum security facility and locked-
down for twenty-three hours a day,222 alleged that they specifically 
selected him as a person of “high interest” on the basis of race, religion, 
and national origin in violation of his First and Fifth Amendment 
rights.223  He further alleged that both Ashcroft and Mueller willfully and 
maliciously knew of, condoned, and agreed to subject Iqbal to this 
discriminatory treatment.224  Because Iqbal alleged invidious 
discrimination, he had to “plead sufficient factual matter to show that 
interpreted this language as preventing the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), “unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief.”  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).  In Twombly, the majority 
instead announced that pleadings must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  The Court instructed that a claim has facial 
“plausibility” only when a plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to allow the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.  Id.  Two years later in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, the Court emphasized that the plausibility standard of Twombly governs the pleading standard 
“in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 684 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
216.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
217.  Id. at 683. 
218.  Id. at 679. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. at 678. 
221.  Id. at 668.  A Bivens suit is a judicially crafted cause of action against federal agents for 
violation of constitutional rights.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392-95 (1971).  Although judicially crafted, many of its doctrinal defenses 
track those of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 222.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668.  Iqbal eventually pled guilty to crimes related to fraudulent 
immigration documentation and was deported.  Id. 
223.  Id. at 667. 
224.  Id. at 669. 
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[Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and implemented the detention policies 
at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of 
discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.”225  The 
Court concluded that it was far more plausible that Ashcroft and 
Mueller’s motivation was a benign or neutral motivation to hold 
immigration violators in secure conditions until they could be identified 
or cleared as potential terrorists.226  The Court recognized that the 
detention “would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab 
Muslims,”227 but that alone did not make discriminatory motive more 
plausible than a neutral alternative. 
Professor Darrell A. H. Miller criticizes Iqbal for “invit[ing] judges 
to determine plausibility based upon their own experience, rather than 
forcing them to do the hard work to imagine themselves in the scenario 
presented within the four corners of the complaint.”228  Jerry Kang and 
his esteemed co-authors also condemn the plausibility standard for 
entitling district court judges to make a decision based only on “minimal 
facts that can be alleged before discovery” and which may not be 
sufficient “to ground that judgment in much more than the judge’s 
schemas.”229  Whether a judge can accurately assess whether an event is 
plausible may have much to do with whether, and how, the judge has 
experienced the event alleged.230 
IV. AN EMPATHETIC APPROACH TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
As discussed above, research on human cognition proves that 
judges bring various influences, such as age, gender, generation, 
225.  Id. at 676-77. 
226.  Id. at 683. 
227.  Id. at 682. 
228.  Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1011 (2010). 
229.  Kang, Courtroom, supra note 61, at 1162.  Kang and his co-authors recognize that it may 
not be possible to test whether explicit or implicit biases influence how actual judges decide 
motions to dismiss actual cases. However, they point to preliminary data about dismissal rates pre- 
and post-Iqbal to support their hypothesis that Iqbal’s plausibility standard poses a risk of 
increasing the impact of implicit biases at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage for race discrimination claims 
than other claims because judges are likely to have stronger biases that plaintiffs in the former type 
of case have less valid claims than those in the latter.  Id. at 1162-63. 
 230.  Id.  As Professor Jessie Hill wrote of Justice Kennedy in Iqbal: “[Y]ou can almost read 
between the lines to hear him saying, ‘I have never been a victim of discrimination, and I certainly 
cannot imagine folks like John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, folks just like me, engaging in illegal 
discrimination against Muslims in the wake of 9/11. . . .”‘ Miller, supra note 228, at 1008 (quoting 
Posting of Jessie Hill to Prawfs Blog, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/some-
belated-thoughts-on-twombly-iqbal-and-sotomayor.html (May 31, 2009, 15:18 EST)) (“It seems to 
me that plausibility as a legal standard—though it surely makes appearances elsewhere in the law—
inherently calls on the judge to make judgments based on life experiences.”). 
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religion, and values with them to the decisionmaking process.231  
Research supports that judges’ early lives, their experiences both on and 
off the bench, and their professional careers instill in them certain ideas, 
beliefs, and attitudes about issues and people.  These unconscious 
influences tell judges how to define situations and encourage decisions 
consistent with their beliefs or attitudes.”232 Cognitive science teaches us 
that one’s own experience is the unconscious starting point for 
decisionmaking.  In light of the hidden influences that cause us to 
sometimes “believe what we want to believe because we want to believe 
it,” judges should be vigilantly suspicious of their judgments,233 
particularly those made within the open space of the law.  Although 
reliance on ingrained schema is difficult to overcome, implicit biases 
caused by categories and schemas may be mitigated or even 
eliminated234 by first recognizing that race, gender, sexual orientation, 
and other social categories may be influencing decisionmaking, “relying 
less mindlessly on a given schema, and scrutinizing more thoroughly the 
particular situation.”235  In other words, 
The way to guard against the risk of personal subjective judgments is 
not to deny the limits of one’s starting point, but to acknowledge them, 
and to then seek to glimpse the points of view of others.  This at least 
protects against self-delusion about the impact of personal perspective; 
it may also afford insights broadening the judge’s understanding of the 
problem at issue.  Increasing the self-consciousness of the judge in the 
act of judgment may also enlarge the judge’s ability to understand oth-
er human beings.  This means attending to the parties and those likely 
to be in their situations in the future.236 
Reliance on categories and schemas are mitigated through mindful 
thinking.  The critical components of mindful thinking include: the 
“creation of new categories,” “openness to new information,” and 
“awareness of more than one perspective.”237  As explained below, 
empathy is a tool and capacity that accomplishes these goals. 
“The function of empathy is to help one understand and relate to 
231.  Nugent, supra note 1, at 6. 
232.  Id. at 19-20.  See Uphoff, supra note 182, at 522. 
233.  KUNDA, supra note 2, at 212. 
234.  Chen & Hanson, supra note 5, at 1229. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 
52 (1988). 
 237.  Chen & Hanson, supra note at 5, at 1235 (quoting ELLEN LANGER, MINDFULNESS 61-79 
(1989)). 
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another person.”238  Thus, empathy is perspective-taking;239 it is a tool to 
overcome the limitations of experience.  In exercising empathy, 
“individuals can choose to actively imagine themselves in the position of 
another as compensation for a lack of previous experience.”240  The 
capacity to understand what others are thinking or feeling is a cognitive 
capacity that is an essential tool for life in our social world.241  In its 
most severe form, a lack of empathy may be characterized as “mind-
blindness—an inability to accurately infer, or perhaps even to recognize, 
the existence of others’ thoughts and feelings.”242 
While the mention of empathy in connection with Supreme Court 
nominations ignited a concern about liberal-leaning overreaching, 
empathy is void of judgment.  As Dr. Michael Franz Basch, a 
psychotherapist and prominent scholar on the topic of empathy, 
observes: 
Empathy is first and foremost a capacity. Strictly thinking, it is value-
free. Empathic thinking . . . is a function that the human brain at a cer-
tain level of development is potentially capable of performing, no more 
and no less.  This is often not understood, and empathy becomes con-
fused with altruism and other-directedness, though it need not be em-
ployed in the service of either goal. . . .  What one does with the insight 
provided by empathic understanding remains to be determined by the 
nature of the relationship between the people involved and the purpose 
for which the empathic capacity was engaged by its user in the first 
place.243 
As Martha Nussbaum observes, empathy is neither a good nor a bad 
thing. 
Empathy by itself . . . is ethically neutral.  A good sadist or torturer has 
to be highly empathetic to understand what would cause his or her vic-
tim maximal pain.  Nor, I believe, is empathy always necessary for 
238.  Id. 
 239.  Frederique de Vignemont & Tania Singer, The Empathetic Brain: How, When and Why?, 
10 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 435, 435 (2006).  (With cognitive perspective taking, one “represents 
the mental states of others, including affective states, without being emotionally involved.”); see 
also Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 4 Table 2 (2002) (referring to this phenomenon as “cognitive empathy” or 
“true empathy” or “perspective-taking”). 
240.  Miller, supra note 228, at 1010. 
241.  Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 67, at 9. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and The Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE 
NOVO 133, 136-37 (2009) [hereinafter, Bandes, Empathetic Judging] (citing Michael Franz Basch, 
Empathic Understanding: A Review of the Concept and Some Theoretical Considerations, 31 J. AM. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 101, 119, 123 (1983)). 
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compassion: we can have compassion for the sufferings of non-human 
animals without being able to put ourselves inside their minds.244 
Empathy is commonly defined as “[t]he power of projecting one’s 
personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of 
contemplation.”245  It is “an imaginative reconstruction of another 
person’s experience.”246  While “empathy” is often used interchangeably 
with the terms “love” or “sympathy,”247 it actually encompasses specific 
psychological experience.248  “‘Empathy’ is a term derived from the 
German word Einfiahlung which describes aesthetic perceptions.”249  
Because translations of Einfiahlung sometimes used the word 
“sympathy,” the meanings of “sympathy” and “empathy” are often 
confused.250  As originally interpreted, “empathy” referred to a physical 
reaction, such as the instinct to grimace when someone else hurts 
herself.251  This meaning expanded to include the concept of feeling 
emotions, such as anger, fear, joy, love, from others.252 
“Empathy is not a dissolution of ‘ego boundaries’ or absorption of 
self by other—it is a means of relating to another or making another 
intelligible.”253  It is an “imaginative experiencing of the situation of 
another.”254  Empathy helps us understand “that others are separate from 
us, with separate mental states, desires, beliefs, and perceptions.”255  
Thus, to understand another person’s perspective requires a judge to 
“stand in the shoes”256 of the other person, that is, to think, feel, and 
244.  Martha Nussbaum, Reply to Amnon Reichman, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 320, 325 (2006). 
245.  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://www.oed.com. 
246.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 
301-02 (2001). 
 247.  Daniel Batson, one of the most influential researchers in this field, recently wrote a 
chapter, in which he explains that “empathy” has been used to refer to “eight related but distinct 
phenomena.”  C. Daniel Batson, These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related But Distinct 
Phenomena, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 3-15 (Jean Decety & William Ickes eds., 
2009). 
 248.  Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987) 
(identifying three basic phenomena captured by the word “empathy”: “(1) feeling the emotion of 
another; (2) understanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively and cognitively, 
often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other; and (3) action brought about 
by experiencing the distress of another (hence the confusion of empathy with sympathy and 
compassion).”).  For purposes of this Article, I adopt the second common definition. 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. 
251.  Id. at 1579-80. 
252.  Id. at 1580. 
253.  Id. at 1581. 
254.  Id. 
255.  Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 243, at 138. 
256.  Martha Minow describes empathy as capable of being generated by an act of the 
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understand what that person would think, feel, and understand.257  It 
requires one to become “an intelligent reader of that person’s story.”258  
“Perspective taking requires getting beyond one’s own literal or 
psychological point of view to consider the perspective of another 
person who is likely to have a very different psychological point of 
view.”259  Overcoming one’s limited viewpoint is therefore the essence 
of accurate perspective-taking.260 
Although it is an essential capacity, empathy is not easy to 
accomplish.261  Successfully performing this “particular feat of mental 
gymnastics” requires a person to actively think about another person’s 
mental state and then try to experience or infer the other person’s 
perceptions.262  One’s own perspective is the default position that is 
immediately and automatically activated, whereas reasoning about 
another’s perspective is typically slow, deliberate, and difficult.263  Thus, 
perspective-taking can be incomplete or inaccurate because we are likely 
to experience it most easily toward those with whom we identify most 
readily.264  When judges face litigants from backgrounds with which 
they are familiar and comfortable, their perspective-taking on behalf of 
such litigants is so natural it is unlikely to be truly empathetic.265  For 
example, justices often identify most readily with governmental 
officials, including other judges.  Justice Rehnquist, discussing why 
judges have afforded themselves absolute immunity from civil rights 
suits while denying it to so many other government officials, suggested 
that: 
If one were to hazard an informed guess as to why such a distinction in 
treatment between judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and other 
imagination, such as imaginatively placing yourself in someone’s shoes.  See generally Martha 
Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 236 
, at 51 (“Taking the perspective of another involves both a cognitive effort to see the world from the 
vantage point of someone else and a willingness to try to understand what she feels about what she 
sees from that vantage point.”). 
257.  See Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 243, at 137. 
 258.  Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 
270 (2003). 
259.  Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping into Others’ 
Shoes, in HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 297 (Keith Markman et al. eds., 
2009). 
260.  Id. 
261.  Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 67, at 12. 
262.  Epley & Caruso, supra note 259, at 299 (“[T]here is no more immediate barrier to 
accurate perspective taking than failing to use it in the first place.”). 
263.  Id. 
264.  Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 67, at 12. 
265.  Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 243, at 139. 
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public officials on the other, obtains, mine would be that those who 
decide the common law know through personal experience the sort of 
pressures that might exist for such decisionmakers in the absence of 
absolute immunity, but may not know or may have forgotten that simi-
lar pressures exist in the case of nonjudicial public officials to whom 
difficult decisions are committed.266 
Justice Cardozo’s comment, quoted by Justice Brennan, reveals why 
taking the perspective of another is so difficult: “‘Deep below 
consciousness are the other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the 
predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions 
and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant 
or judge.’”267  Judges “possess ‘subconscious loyalties’ to the groups ‘in 
which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship 
have given us a place.’”268  Thus, empathy is difficult for the same 
reasons it is necessary—both the judge and litigant are entangled by 
biases and are thus “unavoidably situated in his or her own 
experience.”269 
“Empathy” is a term that refers to the difficult feat of understanding 
the perspectives of people from very different backgrounds.270  For 
 266.  Id. at 141 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 529 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)).  A significant number of judges were former prosecutors before taking the bench.  
Uphoff, supra note 182, at 529 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Source 
Book (2003), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t1822005.pdf) (showing that between 1963 
and 2005, between 38 percent and 50 percent of the Presidential appointees to U.S. District Court 
judgeships had prosecutorial experience).  Professor Uphoff asserts that a significant number of 
judges with prior prosecutorial experience “bring a decidedly pro-prosecution attitude to the bench,” 
which leads judges to presume that most defendants are guilty, and affects the manner in which 
many judges rule on motions, evaluate witnesses, and exercise their discretion.  Uphoff, supra note 
182, at 529, 533.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1110 (1976) (quoting Interview with C. J. Occhippinti, Alaska Superior 
Court Judge, Columbia Law Review (Jun. 10, 1967), “[e]ven in the absence of plea bargaining, I 
know that ninety-nine percent of all defendants are guilty, but I still give them their fair trials”). 
 267.  William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 3, 5 (1988) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 
(Yale University Press 1921)). 
268.  Id. at 4-5 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 267, at 175). 
269.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 236, at 52. 
 270.  Id.  See Abrams, Empathy and Experience, supra note 188, at 274.  “[Empathy] is 
characterized not by the pity we feel for others but by our attempt to understand their reality. . . .  
We doff our own experience and try on another. For a moment, we live someone else’s life.”  John 
Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of President Obama’s “Empathy 
Standard,” 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 100 (2010).  Thus, perspective-taking “entails the active 
consideration of another’s point of view, imagining what the person’s life and situation are like, 
walking a mile in the person’s shoes.”  Adam D. Galinsky & Gillian Ku, The Effects of Perspective-
Taking on Prejudice: The Moderating Role of Self-Evaluation, in 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 594, 604 (2004). 
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example, former Justice William Brennan explained that the experiential 
narratives of another, such as he read in the briefs in Goldberg v. 
Kelly,271 can create a moment of empathy for and understanding of a life 
very different from one’s own.272  It can mean understanding the 
consequences of judicial decisionmaking for other groups that are not 
identical to your group, but have something loosely in common.273  It is 
possible to empathize with people far distant from your experiential base 
because you see similar dynamics (e.g., a person who is a member of an 
outgroup in one setting or situation might identify with someone who is 
a member of an outgroup in another), or to empathize or envision 
consequences for both sides.274  It can also be an approach that one takes 
toward all people.275  In this way, empathy “will help to broaden the 
group to which [the judge’s] subconscious loyalties are due.”276 
Thus, empathy properly exercised is not an identification with the 
party with whom we can most identify with based on our personal 
experiences; rather, it is a challenge to move away from our own 
experiences to understand the different world inhabited by one who is 
very different from us.  Professor Mary Anne Franks proposes a 
definition that takes into account this important point: “empathy is the 
exercise of our moral imagination against, or at least indifferent to, our 
own self-interest.”277  “Empathy forces us to imagine and to have 
concern for those who are radically different from, even threatening to, 
ourselves and our values.”278  The most important aspect of empathy is 
that it challenges the presumption that we are objective or impartial.279  
Empathy allows the judge to appreciate more fully the problem before 
her.  It can help guide a decision-maker to the correct outcome, but it 
does not dictate a result or solve the problem for her.280  It simply insists 
that we question our assumptions and biases and it forces us to consider 
 271.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (deciding whether the Due Process Clause 
requires that a welfare recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of 
benefits). 
272.  Brennan, supra note 267, at 31. 
273.  Abrams, Empathy and Experience, supra note 188, at 274-75. 
274.  Id. at 275. 
275.  Id. 
276.  CARDOZO, supra note 267, at 176. 
277.  Mary Anne Franks, Lies, Damned Lies, and Judicial Empathy, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 61, 68 
(2011). 
278.  Id. at 69. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1646-47 (2010). 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/3
2014] JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 729 
interests other than our own.281  It is through an exercise of empathy 
defined in this way, “by which judges attempt to understand the 
motivations, intentions, and goals of the litigants before them,”282 but 
unlike sympathy, a truly empathic approach will not sway the judge to 
prefer one side over the other.283 
A growing body of research provides evidence that empathy, 
defined as perspective-taking or imagining oneself in the shoes of 
someone from a different social or ethnic group, is a cognitive strategy 
that can reduce stereotyping.284  Recent experiments using various 
interventions to make participants engage in more perspective-taking 
have demonstrated that actively contemplating others’ psychological 
experiences weakens the automatic expression of racial biases.285  For 
example, in one experiment, before seeing a five-minute video of a black 
man being treated worse than an identically situated white man, 
participants were asked to imagine “what they might be thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing if they were Glen [the black man], looking at 
the world through his eyes and walking in his shoes as he goes through 
the various activities depicted in the documentary.”286  The control group 
was told to remain objective and emotionally detached.  In other 
variations, perspective-taking was triggered by requiring participants to 
write an essay imagining a day in the life of a young black male.  These 
perspective-taking activities substantially decreased implicit bias as 
measured by the IAT and behavioral changes.287  For example, the 
researchers found that those in the perspective-taking condition chose to 
sit closer to a black interviewer,288 and black experimenters rated their 
interaction with white participants put in the perspective-taking 
condition more positively.289 
 281.  Frank, supra note 18. See Laura E. Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3 FLA. COASTAL 
L.J. 205, 210 (2002) (citing Richard Posner, Emotions versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE 
PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)).  Posner praises empathy for its cognitive 
character, suggesting that it more likely reflects an evaluation of beliefs, rather than an ungrounded 
emotional reaction that short-circuits reasoning. 
282.  Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 67, at 8. 
283.  Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted). 
284.  See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing 
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, in 78 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL., 708, 724 (2000). 
 285.  Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial 
Bias, in 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1027 (2011). 
286.  See id. at 1030. 
287.  See id. at 1035. 
288.  See id. 
289.  See id. at 1037. 
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V. APPLYING AN EMPATHETIC APPROACH 
A. Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness” 
Areas of the law that require a judge to apply a “reasonableness” 
standard exemplify the need for empathy in decisionmaking.  A judge’s 
personal experience and prior assumptions constitute an unconscious 
starting point for issues, such as reasonableness, that lie within the “open 
space.”290  For example, in United States v. Jones,291 the Justices used 
their own experiences as a frame of reference to understand whether 
attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s car without a proper warrant 
violates the Fourth Amendment. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a 
search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our 
movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that under 
your theory? 
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court? 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. (Laughter.) 
MR. DREEBEN: Under our theory and under this Court’s cases, the 
Justices of this Court when driving on public roadways have no greater 
expectation of – 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is yes, you could to-
morrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our cars, fol-
low us for a month; no problem under the Constitution? 
. . . . 
JUSTICE BREYER: What . . . is the question that I think people are 
driving at, at least as I understand it and certainly share the concern, is 
that if you win this case, then there is nothing to prevent the police or 
the government from monitoring 24 hours a day the public movement 
of every citizen of the United States.292 
Without understanding the subtle yet powerful influences of bias, the 
“reasonableness” inquiry can begin and end at what fits within a judge’s 
own experience.  Therefore, there is a heightened risk of implicit bias 
 290.  POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 29, at 116 (observing that when judges are 
confronted with ambiguous facts that touch on charged issues they, like everyone else, “fall back on 
their intuitions” and display “[t]he kind of telescoped reasoning . . . called . . . ‘cultural cognition’”). 
291.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 292.  Oral Argument of United States v. Jones, Id. (No. 10 1259), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf [emphasis added]. 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/3
2014] JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 731 
influencing the decision. 
The ideal of justice includes an aspiration to try to step beyond person-
al predilections and prejudices. . . .  But these aspirations are for 
naught if the judge fails to challenge his or her own point of view, and 
takes in all evidence and arguments without examining the tilt created 
by his or her own angle of vision. The very aspirational language of 
impersonality and objectivity, while aiming to stretch the judge beyond 
personal prejudices, denies the need to acknowledge the impact of 
one’s own perspective in the process of trying to see another’s point of 
view.  There is a real risk of imposing one’s own perspective by claim-
ing already to be impartial and objective—by claiming, indeed, to be 
the kind of reasonable person whose standards provide the standards 
for judging the conduct of others.293 
Empathy gives pause to our intuition of what may be reasonable, 
challenges a judge to question whether a response to a legal problem is 
based on a myopic view, or motivates a judge to adopt an opposite 
viewpoint to consider whether that view may also be reasonable. 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is an “open space” in the law 
because the ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures”294 offers little 
guidance to judges on how to protect individuals from overzealous 
criminal investigations.  The text does not provide any coherent 
principles for determining when a search or seizure is unreasonable, or 
even whether a search or seizure has occurred at all.  As a result, 
deciding Fourth Amendment issues “require[s] judgment calls that 
inescapably are influenced by—if not based on—a judge’s own views 
and experiences” and thus, calls for an empathetic approach to 
decisionmaking.295 
The Supreme Court views the prohibition on unreasonable searches 
in light of the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy.296  Assessing 
the constitutionality of a purported search requires the court to determine 
whether the government’s action constitutes a “search,” and then 
whether the search is reasonable.  The threshold question of whether a 
governmental intrusion is deemed a search depends on the highly 
subjective question, first articulated in Katz v. United States, of whether 
the government had intruded upon an “expectation of privacy . . . that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.”‘297  “Katz’s reasonable 
293.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 236, at 52. 
294.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
295.  Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 1070. 
296.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
297.  See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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expectation of privacy test became a way for the Justices to appoint 
themselves arbiters of which privacy expectations to afford society.”298  
Instead of determining whether privacy expectations were reasonable, 
based on an empathetic approach that considers a variety of perspectives 
or empirical data of when most citizens regard their possessions or 
conversations as being private, “the Justices [have] applied Katz 
normatively, based on how privacy should operate.”299  By deciding 
when the government had intruded upon a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the “Justices have dictated to society when society’s 
assumptions about privacy were acceptable.”300  As Justice Alito 
acknowledged in his concurrence in Jones, the Katz expectation of 
privacy test “involves a degree of circularity . . . and judges are apt to 
confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical 
reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”301 
Illinois v. Wardlow, another Supreme Court search and seizure 
case, exemplifies a failure of empathy.  In Wardlow, the Court decided 
the issue of whether it would be unreasonable for police to stop someone 
purely on the basis that the person ran when he saw the officer.302  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that “[h]eadlong 
flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion.”303  
Although the majority explained that the “determination of reasonable 
suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences 
about human behavior,”304 the Court likely answered the question of 
whether there are “good reasons for someone to run from the police even 
if he’s done nothing wrong?’ with ‘no, because I wouldn’t.’”305  It was 
beyond the majority’s perception to understand that in the context of 
high-crime areas, including communities typically populated by blacks 
 298.  Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth 
Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 65 (2012). 
299.  Id. 
300.  Id. at 65. 
301.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (Alito, J. concurring). “The Katz test—
whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”  Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).  See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view, the only thing the past three decades have established about 
the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, those ‘actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy’ ‘that 
society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable,”‘ . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those 
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”). 
302.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
303.  Id. at 124. 
304.  Id. at 125. 
305.  Franks, supra note 277, at 70. 
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and Hispanics, “flight constitutes a reasonable reaction to a continuing 
pattern of police abuse and harassment of minority citizens” and “flight 
from law enforcement officials is a mode of survival; it is the 
mechanism for avoiding confrontations.”306 
The Court’s reasoning evinces a refusal to acknowledge that there 
are other reasonable and compelling experiences of the world besides its 
own, or to recognize that “reasonable” can have different meanings 
depending on one’s life experiences.  As Mary Anne Franks suggests, 
[t]he failure of logic here is . . . intimately connected to the failure of 
empathy.  If a person over-identifies so much with his own experiences 
that he assumes them to be universal, then he not only cannot hear the 
experiences of others in any meaningful way, but he also may be una-
ble to hear the question actually being asked.307 
Let us return to the facts summarized at the beginning of this Article to 
further illustrate this point.  The first scenario is the story of Scott v. 
Harris, another Fourth Amendment case in which the Supreme Court 
had to “slosh [its] way through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness.’”308  In that case, the Court was asked to decide 
whether a police officer’s use of deadly force to terminate a high-speed 
chase constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.309  Harris sued Scott in Federal District Court, alleging that 
Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive 
force.310  Scott filed for summary judgment, claiming qualified 
immunity.311  The District Court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,312 adopting Harris’s 
assertions that, during the chase, there was little, if any, actual threat to 
pedestrians or other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty and 
Harris remained in control of his vehicle: 
[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, [Harris] remained 
in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typi-
 306.  Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 384 (2001).  See also United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1996) vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (noting with respect to the behavior of 
residents of New York’s high-crime Washington Heights district: “After the attendant publicity 
surrounding [a high-profile investigation into police corruption], had the men not run when the cops 
began to stare at them, it would have been unusual”). 
307.  Franks, supra note 277, at 70-71. 
308.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). 
309.  Id. at 374. 
310.  Id. at 376. 
311.  Id. 
312.  Id. 
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cally used his indicators for turns.  He did not run any motorists off the 
road.  Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking 
lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center 
was closed.  Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the 
highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been 
cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police block-
ades of the nearby intersections.313 
Stating that they were “happy to allow the videotape to speak for 
itself,”314 the eight Justices in the majority found that the evidence told 
“quite a different story.”315 
There we see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads 
in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast.  We see it 
swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow 
line, and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective 
shoulders to avoid being hit.  We see it run multiple red lights and 
travel for considerable periods of time in the occasional center left-
turn-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in the 
same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.  Far from being the cau-
tious and controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the 
video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most 
frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike 
at great risk of serious injury.316 
Thus, the majority had “little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable 
for Scott to take the action that he did.”317 
Justice Stevens dissented, stating that “the tape actually confirms, 
rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual 
questions at issue.”318  He suggests that the other Justices’ experiences 
account for their view of the facts. 
Had they learned to drive when most high-speed driving took place on 
two-lane roads rather than on superhighways—when split second 
judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of oncom-
ing traffic were routine—they might well have reacted to the videotape 
more dispassionately.319 
As Dan Kahan and his co-authors observed, “In reporting that he, at 
313.  Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 815-16 (2007) (citations omitted). 
314.  Harris, 550 U.S. at 375 n.5. 
315.  Id. at 379. 
316.  Id. at 379-80. 
317.  Id. at 384. 
318.  Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
319.  Id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
42
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/3
2014] JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 735 
least, saw something different, Justice Stevens was plainly advancing the 
claim that the tape doesn’t speak for itself—that different people, with 
different experiences, can see different things in it.”320  By implying that 
“no reasonable person could view the videotape and come to the 
conclusion that deadly force was unjustified in doing so,” the Court 
“implicitly labeled the four other judges to review the case 
unreasonable.”321  The majority’s decision “effectively determined that, 
regardless of whatever other evidence might be presented in the case and 
whatever might transpire in the course of jury deliberations, there could 
be no room for ‘reasonable’ disagreement on either the magnitude of the 
risks involved in the case or the role of the police in reducing or 
exacerbating those risks.”322 
Professors Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman 
responded to the Court’s invitation to determine whether the Scott v. 
Harris tape speaks for itself and conducted an empirical study to test the 
Court’s conclusion and their hypothesis that reactions to the Scott tape 
would be shaped by group identities and values.323  They showed the 
video to a diverse sample of approximately 1,350 Americans, asked 
them what they saw, and to state their views on the dispositive issues, as 
identified by the Court.324  Although a substantial majority did interpret 
the facts the way the Court did, there were differences in perceptions 
across identifiable subgroups.325  A very sizable majority of a “diverse, 
nationally representative sample agreed with the Scott majority that 
Harris’s driving exposed the public and the police to lethal risks, that 
Harris was more at fault than the police for putting the public in danger, 
and that deadly force ultimately was reasonable to terminate the 
chase.”326  However, the results clearly showed that those who disagreed 
about the appropriateness of deadly force shared certain “identity-
defining characteristics.”327  Specifically, members of various 
subcommunities such as African-Americans, low-income workers, and 
Northeast residents, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff 
 320.  Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARVARD L. REV. 837, 848 (2009). 
 321.  Harris, 550 U.S. at 395.  Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that “If two groups of judges 
can disagree so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that 
pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s 
characterization of events.”  Id. at 396. 
322.  Kahan, supra note 320, at 880. 
323.  Id. at 877-878. 
324.  Id. at 841. 
325.  Id. at 864. 
326.  Id. at 879. 
327.  Id. 
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views of the facts than did the Court.328  Statistically the difference 
between males and females was only marginally significant; however, 
women were generally more pro-plaintiff.329  As the Justices in Wardlow 
also failed to appreciate, beliefs about the abuse of police power and 
reasons for attempting to avoid police encounters “vary across socio-
demographic and political groups.”330 
The study demonstrates that people are likely to interpret the scene 
depicted in the tape in a way that reinforces the schemas of their 
socioeconomic and political peers.331  In announcing that the minority 
view is unreasonable, the Justices in the majority likely did not 
recognize how their own perceptions “would be just as bound up with 
cultural, ideological, and other commitments that disposed them to see 
the facts in a particular way.”332  Because of their personal and 
professional experiences, judges “social realities” differ from ordinary 
citizens.333  As Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman aptly assert, “The Court’s 
failure to recognize the culturally partial view of social reality that its 
conclusion embodies is symptomatic of a kind of cognitive bias that is 
endemic to legal and political decisionmaking.”334 
Without referring to the approach as empathetic, Kahan and his co-
authors suggest “that one way to compensate for the partiality, and the 
incipient partisanship, of their own factual perceptions is to attend to 
cues that a cultural subcommunity will react with outrage should judges 
privilege their own factual perceptions.”335  Empathy gives a judge 
“reason to rethink, and might, in some cases, furnish her a reason to 
decide a case in a manner contrary to her own inclinations.”336  An 
empathetic approach could serve as an “effective debiasing strategy”337 
by giving judges pause to consider whether what strikes them as an 
“obvious” fact might actually be interpreted differently by an 
328.  Kahan, supra note 320, at 841. 
329.  Id. at 867. 
330.  Id. at 853. 
331.  Id. 
332.  Id. at 897. 
333.  See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 248 (1986) (“[T]he 
overwhelming majority of judges are still white males who come from a privileged sector of our 
society.  Often their views of the world reflect their backgrounds.  Some rather rigidly adhere to a 
narrow perspective of justice and fairness that is not consistent with that of the general 
community.”). 
334.  Kahan, supra note 320, at 881. 
335.  Id. at 898. 
336.  Id. 
337.  Kahan, supra note 320, at 899. 
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identifiable socioeconomic or political subcommunity.338 In exercising 
empathy when ruling on a motion that would summarily resolve a 
dispute, a judge should engage in a “mental double-check.”339  When a 
judge decides that there is no genuine dispute about some set of material 
facts, before concluding that no reasonable juror could find such facts, 
the judge should try to imagine who those potential jurors might be.340  
If such jurors cannot be imagined or would be only “statistical outliers,” 
she should decide the case summarily. However, if, instead, the judge 
can imagine dissenting jurors, with specific demographic, cultural, or 
political characteristics, he should question if his decision regarding 
“reasonableness” is based on his own experience, or whether another 
perspective would be equally reasonable.341 
The Court applies an empathetic approach in Safford v. Redding, in 
which the Court was asked to decide whether a thirteen-year-old 
student’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected 
to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on 
reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and 
over-the-counter drugs to school.342  This case required the Court to 
analyze the intrusiveness of the search, the importance of the 
government’s interest, and whether the government’s means were 
reasonable.343  Resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue thus 
necessitated an understanding of all the litigants’ perspectives.344 “To 
assess how intrusive such a search was, it needed to focus on how it was 
experienced by the litigant and on how it would be experienced by 
others in her place.  To understand the nature of the governmental 
interest, it needed to put itself in the place of school administrators.”345 
Empathy, as perspective-taking, challenges a judge to examine his 
assumptions about how the world works.  As Judge Richard Posner 
asserts, empathy enables a judge to consider litigants’ concerns and 
interests may be affected by the judge’s decisions, even though they may 
 338.  Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Indicate They May Uphold Voter ID Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2008, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/washington/10scotus.html (reporting 
Justice Roberts’ skepticism toward the claim that obtaining official identification at the county seat 
as a prerequisite to voting is burdensome and reply of counsel that “[i]f you’re indigent, [the 
seventeen-mile bus trip from urban Gary to the county seat is] a significant burden” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
339.  Kahan, supra note 320, at 898. 
340.  Id. 
341.  See id. at 898-99. 
342.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
343.  Id. at 370; Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 255, at 145. 
344.  Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 243, at 143-45. 
345.  Id. at 143. 
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not be central to the case.346  Experiencing a connection with a particular 
subcommunity may help a judge take, rather than evade, responsibility 
for the consequences of her decisions.347  As Judge Sotomayor says, “I 
am reminded each day that I render decisions that affect people 
concretely and that I owe them constant and complete vigilance in 
checking my assumptions, presumptions and perspectives[.]”348  Justice 
Souter, for example, imagined the thought process of the principal 
responsible for the students’ safety: 
JUSTICE SOUTER: I’ve got suspicion that some drug is on this kid’s 
person.  My thought process is I would rather have the kid embarrassed 
by a strip search, if we can’t find anything short of that, than to have 
some other kids dead because the stuff is distributed at lunchtime and 
things go awry.  Is that the basis?  Is that thought process, that reason-
ing, the basis for a—a reasonable strip search? 
Empathy challenges judges to be “aware of their reactions to the parties 
and their arguments so they—and those who evaluate their decisions—
can examine their assumptions, identify their blind spots and prejudices, 
and seek out additional information and insight when necessary.”349 
Justice Breyer understood that his own experience and perspective was 
limited, and thus, that he needed more information about how a thirteen-
year-old girl would experience the search. 
JUSTICE BREYER: I’m trying to work out why is this a major thing 
to say strip down to your underclothes, which children do when they 
change for gym, they do fairly frequently, not to—you know, and there 
are only two women there.  Is—how bad is this, underclothes?  That’s 
what I’m trying to get at.  I’m asking because I don’t know.350 
. . . . 
In my experience when I was 8 or 10 or 12 years old, you know, we 
did take our clothes off once a day, we changed for gym, okay?  And 
in my experience, too, people did sometimes stick things in my under-
wear (Laughter.)  Or not my underwear.  Whatever.  Whatever.  I was 
the one who did it?  I don’t know.  I mean, I don’t think it’s beyond 
 346.  Little, supra note 281, at 210 (citing Richard Posner, Emotions versus Emotionalism in 
Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)). 
 347.  See Richard Posner, EMOTION AND EMOTIONALISM IN LAW, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 
309, 323-24 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999). 
348.  Sotomayor, supra note 187, at 93. 
349.  Bandes, Moral Imagination, supra note 67, at 12. 
350.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, No. 08-479 (Apr. 
21, 2009), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-479.pdf. 
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human experience, not beyond human experience.351 
Justice Ginsburg explained that this was not merely a locker room 
routine, but the search of a thirteen-year-old girl forced to strip to her 
underwear and shake out her bra and pants in front of school officials. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I don’t think there’s any dispute what was 
done in the case of both of these girls.  It wasn’t just that they were 
stripped to their underwear.  They were asked to shake their bra out, 
to—to shake, stretch the top of their pants and shake that out. 
Souter’s majority opinion clearly makes an effort to understand the 
perspective of both parties.  It acknowledged Savana’s subjective 
expectation of privacy against such a search was “inherent in her 
account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating.”352  The 
Court looked beyond its limited perspectives by considering the Brief for 
the National Association of Social Workers and school psychology 
research to determine that “reasonableness of her expectation (required 
by the Fourth Amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent 
experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent 
vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure.”  It 
further acknowledged that 
The common reaction of these adolescents simply registers the obvi-
ously different meaning of a search exposing the body from the experi-
ence of nakedness or near undress in other school circumstances.  
Changing for gym is getting ready for play; exposing for a search is re-
sponding to an accusation reserved for suspected wrongdoers and fair-
ly understood as so degrading that a number of communities have de-
cided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have 
banned them no matter what the facts may be.353 
The Court also expressed understanding of the administration’s interest. 
In so holding, we mean to cast no ill reflection on the assistant princi-
pal, for the record raises no doubt that his motive throughout was to 
eliminate drugs from his school and protect students. . . .  Parents are 
known to overreact to protect their children from danger, and a school 
351.  Id. 
352.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 366 (2009). 
353.  Id. at 375 (citing Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae 
6–14); Irwin A. Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side of School Violence: Educator Policies 
and Practices That May Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7, 13 (1998) (strip 
search can “result in serious emotional damage”). 
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official with responsibility for safety may tend to do the same.354 
The Court’s understanding of both parties’ perspectives allowed a more 
accurate balancing of interests, but did not resolve the issue of how the 
balance should be struck.355 
[E]mpathy enables the decisionmaker to have an appreciation of the 
human meanings of a given legal situation.  Empathy aids both pro-
cesses of discovery—the procedure by which a judge or other legal de-
cisionmaker reaches a conclusion —and processes of justification—the 
procedure used by a judge or other decisionmaker to justify the conclu-
sion—in a way that disembodied reason simply cannot.356 
Empathy facilitates the process of understanding competing points of 
view.357  Because the law attempts to influence human behavior, in 
applying the law, judges must strive “to understand and predict 
motivations, intentions, perceptions, and other aspects of human 
conduct. Empathy makes that understanding possible.”358 
B. The “Reasonable Person” of Sexual and Racial Harassment Law 
Because of the prominence of the reasonable person in sexual 
harassment law,359 judges deciding these cases should be aware of how 
implicit bias privileges particular perspectives, and therefore calls for an 
empathetic approach to decisionmaking.  In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson,360 the United States Supreme Court found that sexual
harassment was actionable under federal anti-discrimination law in those 
situations where it was severe enough to create a hostile work 
environment.361  Determining whether a hostile work environment 
existed is evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable 
person.362 
354.  Safford, 557 U.S. at 377. 
355.  Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 243, at 145. 
356.  Henderson, supra note 248, at 1576.  See Abrams, Empathy and Experience, supra note 
188, at 279 (“When you have an experiential connection to the lives of a particular group, you may 
be able to imagine, with a kind of immediacy or specificity, the effects of a judicial decision on 
members of that group.”) 
357.  Little, supra note 281. 
358.  Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 243, at 139. 
359.  A plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment derives from Title VII’s proscription that “[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his . . . terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s . . . sex. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2013) (§ 703(a)(1) of Title VII). 
360.  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
361.  Id. at 67. 
362.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that Title VII bars conduct 
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Armed now with an understanding of decisionmaking and 
perspective-taking, let us revisit the second scenario, based on the facts 
of Rabidue v. Osceola, presented in Part I of this Article.  In determining 
whether the workplace constituted an “offensive work environment,”363 
the district court judge concluded that the vulgarity, which included 
comments, such as “all that bitch needs is a good lay”364 “merely 
constituted an annoying—but fairly insignificant—part of the total job 
environment.”365  Regarding the obscene posters, including at least one 
violent image, the court stated, “For better or worse, modern America 
features open displays of written and pictorial erotica.  Shopping centers, 
candy stores and prime time television regularly display pictures of 
naked bodies and erotic real or simulated sex acts.  Living in this milieu, 
the average American should not be legally offended by sexually explicit 
posters.”366  As Wendy Pollack aptly observes, in Rabidue, the district 
court judge and Sixth Circuit judges who affirmed the decision reasoned 
that “since the conduct complained of, pornographic displays and vulgar 
comments, is an everyday occurrence to which both men and women are 
subjected, it is natural, acceptable, and part of the fabric of society’s 
morality.  How could it be unwelcome?”367 
On appeal, Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit disagreed vehemently 
with this conclusion. 
that would seriously affect a reasonable person).  See also, Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 
611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[t]o accord appropriate protection to both plaintiffs and 
defendants in a hostile and/or abusive work environment sexual harassment case, the trier of 
fact, . . . must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person’s reaction to a similar environment under 
essentially like or similar circumstances.”). 
 363.  “[T]o state a claim under Title VII, sexual harassment must be (1) sufficiently persuasive 
so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment and (2) be 
sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees.”
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
364.  Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615. 
365.  Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 432. 
366.  Id. at 433.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling. 
In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that Henry’s obscenities, although an-
noying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or 
other female employees.  The evidence did not demonstrate that this single employee’s 
vulgarity substantially affected the totality of the workplace.  The sexually oriented post-
er displays had a de minimis effect on the plaintiff’s work environment when considered 
in the context of a society that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits 
open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, 
at the cinema, and in other public places.  In sum, Henry’s vulgar language, coupled with 
the sexually oriented posters, did not result in a working environment that could be con-
sidered intimidating, hostile, or offensive. 
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. 
 367.  Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experiences vs. Legal Definitions, 13 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 64-65 (1990). 
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I hardly believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degradation 
and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American culture.  
In fact, pervasive societal approval thereof and of other stereotypes sti-
fles female potential and instills the debased sense of self worth which 
accompanies stigmatization.  The presence of pin-ups and misogynous 
language in the workplace can only evoke and confirm the debilitating 
norms by which women are primarily and contemptuously valued as 
objects of male sexual fantasy.  That some men would condone and 
wish to perpetuate such behavior is not surprising. However, the rele-
vant inquiry at hand is what the reasonable woman would find offen-
sive, not society, which at one point also condoned slavery.  I conclude 
that sexual posters and anti-female language can seriously affect the 
psychological well being of the reasonable woman and interfere with 
her ability to perform her job.368 
Judge Keith criticized the majority’s application of a “reasonable 
person” standard for “fail[ing] to account for the wide divergence 
between most women’s views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of 
men”369 and for “sustain[ing of] ingrained notions of reasonable 
behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.”370  In other 
words, the reasonable person standard seemed to privilege male 
understandings of social interaction in the workplace and simultaneously 
to obscure those of women371 because a judge’s frame of reference for 
reasonableness is his own experience and prior assumptions.  Instead, 
Judge Keith called for a better standard, which he named the “reasonable 
victim.”372  Without calling it such, he was advocating an empathetic 
approach to deciding sexual harassment claims that would move male 
judges away from their own ingrained notions of what constitutes a 
hostile work environment, and would focus instead on the perspective of 
the female plaintiff.373 
The Ninth Circuit accepted this empathetic approach in Ellison v. 
Brady,374 the landmark case where, for the first time, a court adopted a 
“reasonable woman”375 standard for hostile work environment sexual 
368.  Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627 (Keith, J. dissenting). 
369.  Id. at 626 (Keith, J. dissenting). 
370.  Id. 
371.  Moran, supra note 48, at 1260. 
372.  Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J. dissenting). 
373.  As Kathryn Adams explains, “Judges might view [the reasonable person standard] as 
authorizing them to decide cases on the basis of their own intuition.  Kathryn Abrams, The 
Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, DISSENT 49-50 (Winter 
1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Reasonable Woman]. 
374.  Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
375.  The “reasonable woman” standard is controversial.  See Abrams, Reasonable Woman, 
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harassment claims.  Kerry Ellison’s male coworker, Sterling Gray, 
repeatedly expressed an interest in getting to know her, asking her to 
lunch, and writing several long, emotionally intense letters.376  The Ninth 
Circuit panel, which consisted of all male judges, stated that, “it is not 
difficult to see why the [male] district court [judge] characterized Gray’s 
conduct as isolated and trivial.”377  Some men may consider Gray to be a 
“modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac.”378  Ellison, however, found the 
letters extremely disturbing because she perceived Gray to be obsessed 
with her.379  Gray “told her he had been ‘watching’ and ‘experiencing’ 
her; he made repeated references to sex; he said he would write again. 
Ellison had no way of knowing what Gray would do next.”380  
Therefore, viewing the case from the perspective of a reasonable 
woman, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it could not “say as a matter of 
law that Ellison’s reaction was idiosyncratic or hyper-sensitive.”381  In 
applying a “reasonable woman” standard, the Ninth Circuit court 
explained that there is a gender-based “gap in perception”—men and 
women are likely to differ as to what constitutes harassment.382  Because 
“women are disproportionately victims of . . . sexual assault,” they may 
be more concerned about displays of sexual behavior at work and may 
reasonably anticipate that overtures from male coworkers might escalate 
into sexual violence, even if a reasonable man might not agree.383  The 
court commented on the dangers of recourse to the reasonable person 
test in sexual harassment: “If we only examined whether a reasonable 
person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the 
risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination.  Harassers 
could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory 
supra note 373, at 50-51 (discussing challenges to the “reasonable woman” standard from the 
feminist movement.)  For example, some feminists have expressed concern that the standard could 
“simply free women judges to resort to their intuitions, in ways that were not uniformly promising 
to female claimants.  Moreover, the standard might prompt the desired response from male judges—
permitting them to indulge their own, biologized visions of female difference.”  Id. at 51.  See also, 
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 166-67 (Mich. 1993). 
The gender-conscious standard . . . places undue emphasis on gender and the particular 
plaintiff while it inappropriately deemphasizes society’s need for uniform standards of 
conduct.  Hence, a gender-conscious standard eliminates community standards and re-
places them with standards formulated by a subset of the community. 
376.  Ellison, 924 F.2d. at 873-74. 
377.  Id.  
378.  Id. at 880. 
379.  Id. at 874. 
380.  Id. at 880. 
381.  Id.  
382.  Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991). 
383.  See id. at 879 & n.10. 
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practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no 
remedy.”384  The Ellison Court thus gave credence to the concern that 
because reasonable tends to get interpreted as “ordinary,” a sex-blind 
reasonable person standard, it suggested, is likely to be male-biased and 
hence to systematically ignore the experiences of women.385 
Although in his Ellison v. Brady dissent Judge Stephens rejected 
the assumption that “men’s eyes do not see what a woman sees through 
her eyes,”386 research on gender differences in perceptions of harassment 
suggest that men and women do differ in their perceptions of sexual 
harassment.387  Although the associated effect is only slightly larger than 
a “small” effect, the difference is consistent across studies, with almost 
every study finding significant differences and concluding that women 
are more likely to perceive social-sexual behavior as harassment than are 
men.388  This gender difference is largest for the ambiguous behaviors, 
such as sexual jokes or gestures that are often associated with hostile 
environment harassment.389  Moreover, when third parties evaluate 
incidents of social-sexual behavior involving a man and a woman, 
female third parties are more likely to view the incident as sexual 
harassment and to hold the man accountable for the incident than are 
male third parties.390 
Although there are mixed results regarding the impact of judges’ 
gender and race on sexual harassment cases, some personal 
characteristics, particularly those associated with political conservatism 
(age, political affiliation), have been found to consistently influence 
judge decisions.391  “[A] judge’s personal characteristics may be most 
influential in discrimination or harassment cases in which the issues are 
directly associated with race or gender.”392  The research suggests that 
“[i]n the context of complex social judgments, judges may be unable to 
systematically process all of the relevant information and instead rely on 
heuristics based on their political experiences.”393  Thus, exercising 
384.  Id. at 878. 
385.  Id. at 879. 
386.  Id. at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
387.  Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal 
Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 73 
(2003). 
388.  Id. 
389.  Id. 
390.  Id. 
391.  Id. at 74. 
392.  Id. 
393.  Id. at 82 (concluding that “These effects are not necessarily due to any intentional bias on 
the part of the judge—instead, they may reflect the inherent ambiguity of legal information and the 
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empathy, regardless of whether the applicable standard is called 
reasonable man, woman, or victim, means recognizing this tendency and 
being mindful that reasonableness is not usually a universal truth.  
Understanding that a determination of reasonableness can be shrouded in 
a judge’s own perceptions and taking the time to consider the perception 
of the victim (who is usually an “other”—i.e., a female victim vs. a male 
judge) can help a judge evaluate the facts in a less biased way. 
Analysis of retaliation claims394 for opposing an unlawful 
employment practice under Title VII is also subject to a judge’s implicit 
bias.  Although the test contains “both subjective and objective elements, 
requiring that the plaintiff have a reasonable, good faith belief that the 
alleged employer practices . . . violated Title VII,” some courts have 
treated reasonableness and good faith as if they were identical.395  Thus, 
the doctrine pits the plaintiff’s subjective perception against the judge’s 
own subjective perception.  As Professor Robinson explains, “a black 
employee might in good faith allege racial discrimination, or a female 
employee might in good faith assert sexual discrimination or harassment, 
but a white male judge might readily conclude that the outsider’s good 
faith assertion was unreasonable.”396  Because courts require a plaintiff 
to meet both requirements, and it is difficult for courts to assess the 
subjective good faith component, the “reasonableness” requirement is 
usually dispositive in these cases.397  “Although the reasonableness test 
is framed as ‘objective,’ in application, the judge’s intuitions about 
reasonableness are likely to be shaped by the judge’s race and gender, 
which will usually be white and male.”398  An empathetic approach 
would make the judge “cognizant of perceptual differences, including 
his own.”399 
An example of this approach is evidenced in Harris v. International 
Paper Co.,400 in which a district court in Maine adopted a “reasonable 
black person” standard to assess the severity of racial harassment under 
Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).  In Harris, a 
limited cognitive capacity of judicial decision.”). 
 394.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).  “Unlawful employment practices” include failing or 
refusing to hire, discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual with respect to 
compensation, terms, or conditions of employment because of a protected trait, such as race and sex.  
See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
395.  Robinson, supra note 107, at 1157 (internal citations omitted). 
396.  Id. 
397.  Id. 
398.  Id. 
399.  Id. at 1156. 
400.  Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991), vacated in part for other 
reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991). 
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postcard depicting “Our Gang” with a handwritten caption that said: 
“The new generation of papermakers” was posted next to the time clock 
within a week of the African-American plaintiff’s arrival at the paper 
mill.401  It depicted the “Little Rascals” attempting to wash a dog and the 
black character “Buckwheat” was set apart from the other children, who 
were white.402  The term “Buckwheat” was also used routinely in the 
mill as a racial epithet.403  The court found that these circumstances 
could reasonably be perceived by an African-American to be abusive.404  
“Since the concern of Title VII and the MHRA is to redress the effects 
of conduct and speech on their victims, the fact finder must ‘walk a mile 
in the victim’s shoes’ to understand those effects and how they should be 
remedied.”405  The court then explicitly adopted the “reasonable black 
person” standard by which to measure the hostility of the 
environment.406 
Similarly, in McGinest v. GTE Service Corp.,407 the Ninth Circuit 
extended its reasoning from Ellison v. Brady to racial harassment: 
“[A]llegations of a racially hostile workplace must be assessed from the 
perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic 
group of the plaintiff.”408  The majority reasoned that “[r]acially 
motivated comments or actions may appear innocent or only mildly 
offensive to one who is not a member of the targeted group, but in 
reality be intolerably abusive or threatening when understood from the 
perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the targeted group.”409  The 
court’s adoption of this identity-specific standard was specifically 
designed to counteract “the perspective of an adjudicator belonging to a 
different group than the plaintiff.”410 
C. Self-defense and the “Reasonable Man” 
The reasonable person (or more accurately, reasonable man) has 
also played a role in assessing whether the use of deadly force is 
culpable in the law of self-defense.411  In State v. Wanrow, the 
401.  Id. at 1518. 
402.  Id. 
403.  Id. 
404.  Id. at 1519. 
405.  Id. at 1516. 
406.  Id.  
407.  McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). 
408.  Id. at 1115. 
409.  Id. at 1116. 
410.  Id. 
411.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 539 (4th ed. 2003) (“One who is not the aggressor 
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Washington Supreme Court recognized the danger of bias in the 
application of a reasonable person standard.412  When courts applied the 
reasonable man standard, they implicitly evaluated the reasonableness 
based on two parties (males) who were relatively equal in size and 
strength.413  Thus, for most of the history of the law of self-defense, the 
reliance on the reasonable person effectively precluded women who 
killed their abusive partners from successfully pleading self-defense.414  
However, in Wanrow, the court reversed Yvonne Wanrow’s second-
degree murder conviction and held that use of the reasonable man 
objective standard of self-defense violated Wanrow’s right to equal 
protection of the law.415  Wanrow shot an intoxicated, unarmed man 
whom she knew had a reputation for violence when he approached her in 
a threatening manner.416  At the time, Wanrow, who was five-foot-four, 
had a broken leg and was using a crutch.417  Recognizing that Wanrow’s 
fear and perception of danger were affected by her status as a woman, 
the court held that use of the reasonable man standard in the jury 
instructions418 was improper because it deprived Wanrow of the right to 
have the jury consider her conduct in light of her own perceptions.419 
The impression created—that a 5’4” woman with a cast on her leg and 
using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by a 6’2” 
intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense, unless the 
jury finds her determination of the degree of danger to be objectively 
reasonable—constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law 
and, in the context of this case, violates the respondent’s right to equal 
protection of the law.  The respondent was entitled to have the jury 
consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of the situation, 
in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he 
reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary 
and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.”). 
412.  State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). 
413.  Moran, supra note 48, at 1250. 
414.  Id. 
415.  Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 559. 
416.  Id. at 550-51. 
417.  Id. 
418.  Id. at 558.  That portion of the instruction reads: 
However, when there is no reasonable ground for the person attacked to believe that His 
person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it appears to Him that 
only an ordinary battery is all that is intended, and all that He has reasonable grounds to 
fear from His assailant, He has a right to stand His ground and repel such threatened as-
sault, yet He has no right to repel a threatened assault with naked hands, by the use of a 
deadly weapon in a deadly manner, unless He believes, And has reasonable grounds to 
believe, that He is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
419.  Id. at 559. 
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including those perceptions which were the product of our nation’s 
‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’420 
The court directed that the jury on retrial should be instructed to apply a 
subjective, sex-specific standard of reasonableness.421 
D. “Reasonable Observer” of the Establishment Clause 
The reasonable person also plays a significant role in resolving 
Establishment Clause cases.  The “objective observer” or “reasonable 
observer” test is a legal fiction developed and endorsed by Justice 
O’Connor to determine whether government action demonstrates a 
purpose to endorse or disapprove of a particular religion, or to promote 
religion over non-religion.422  The Court must determine whether the 
effect of the government’s action endorses or approves of religion in the 
eyes of a “reasonable” or “objective” observer,423 who is “acquainted 
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the [relevant 
government action].”424 
For example, applying the reasonable observer test in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, Justice O’Connor implicitly adopts the perspective of a 
Christian.425  Similar to the facts of the third scenario discussed at the 
beginning of this Article, the challenged display included a crèche 
among other Christmas symbols, such as a Santa Claus house, reindeer 
and sleigh, a Christmas tree, a candy-cane pole, and carolers.  Justice 
O’Connor concluded that “Pawtucket’s display of its crèche . . . does not 
communicate a message that the government intends to endorse the 
Christian beliefs represented by the crèche.”426  Although she 
acknowledged that the crèche conveys both religious sectarian messages, 
Justice O’Connor determined that the addition of sectarian symbols such 
as Santa’s sleigh “changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the 
purpose of the display.”427  By insisting that both the symbols and the 
Christmas holiday have “very strong secular components,” Justice 
O’Connor failed to acknowledge that the display only included Christian 
420.  Id. at 558-59. 
421.  Id. 
422.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989). 
423.  Id. 
424.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
425.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
426.  Id. 
427.  Id. 
56
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/3
2014] JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 749 
symbols.428  Justice O’Connor’s assessment embodies the perspective of 
the reasonable Christian: “The display celebrates a public 
holiday, . . .[which] generally is not understood to endorse the religious 
content of the holiday, just as government celebration of Thanksgiving is 
not so understood.”429  Justice O’Connor concludes that the display of 
the Christian crèche “serves a secular purpose—celebration of a public 
holiday with traditional symbols.”430 This assumption that government 
displays of Christian symbols are not religious endorsements strongly 
suggests that she has adopted the viewpoint of a religious believer.431 
Justice Stevens advocates what can be considered an empathetic 
approach and argues that the reasonable observer should “take account 
of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the 
particular religious belief [the display at issue] expresses.”432  The 
“objective observer” standard “presumes that different racial and gender 
groups place the same meaning upon the expressive content of a 
government action that affects them differently.”433  The standard 
presumes that it is possible to view the world without a lens created by 
any particular race, class, or gender perspective.  However, as we now 
know from social science, people do in fact generally view the world 
from the perspective of their race, class, and gender.434  We also know 
that judges have not escaped this propensity.  As a result, the perspective 
of the judge will determine the “objective” observer standard and impose 
that perspective upon the plaintiffs.435  Because different beliefs will 
create different perceptions, there will be several “reasonable” 
observers.436  Thus, the Court’s application of a universal “reasonable” 
observer standard becomes normative.437 
Philosopher D. Z. Phillips asserts that one’s religious belief alters 
his perception of the world.438  Therefore, two people with different 
 428.  Id.  See Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and Endorsement Of 
Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1542 (2010) [hereinafter Abrams, The Reasonable 
Believer]. 
429.  Abrams, The Reasonable Believer, supra note 428, at 1542. 
430.  Id. 
431.  Abrams, The Reasonable Believer, supra note 428. 
432.  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 433.  Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 247, 
250 (2003). 
434.  Id. 
435.  Id. at 287. 
436.  Abrams, The Reasonable Believer, supra note 428, at 1550. 
437.  Id. 
438.  D.Z. PHILLIPS, FAITH AFTER FOUNDATIONALISM 117 (1988) (quoted in Abrams, The 
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religious belief systems, faced with the same facts, will arrive at 
“different moral conclusions.”439  Similarly, political beliefs will also 
influence one’s reactions and conclusions: “Whether an observer would 
‘perceive’ an . . . [endorsement] depends entirely on the observer’s view 
of the proper relation between church and state.”440  Thus, religious and 
political beliefs can lead to different conclusions regarding the 
endorsement question. As Paula Abrams argues, “the reasonable 
observer standard thus relies on the quite unreasonable assumption that 
application of the standard will necessarily yield only one objective 
answer.”441  The Court’s assumption that it can identify one reasonable 
perspective is therefore flawed because a variety of reasonable results 
are possible, depending on the religious and political beliefs of the 
observer.442  An empathetic approach would have the judge consider, as 
Justice Stevens suggested, the perspective of an observer who does not 
share the beliefs expressed by the religious display. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This discussion regarding reasonable people, men, women, and 
observers highlights the legitimate concern with the implicit cognitive 
processes discussed in this Article.  Thus, the realities of how all humans 
make decisions must inform the application of any “reasonable” or 
“objective” test in the law.  That is, a judge must understand that what is 
reasonable can be other than what he or she instinctively believes to be 
so.  Empathy can serve as a “corrective” to a judicial point of view that 
may be uninformed or unaware of the mistakes judges are inclined to 
make because of their own position of privilege and stereotypes.443  
Without an attempt to understand the opposing viewpoint, judges who 
still are predominantly privileged and male, may misread the 
significance of various facts such as treatment in a work environment or 
Reasonable Believer, supra note 428, at 1549). 
 439.  D.Z. PHILLIPS, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY: THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM 95 (1996) 
(quoted in Abrams, The Reasonable Believer, supra note 428, at 1549). 
 440.  Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48 (1985) 
(quoted in Abrams, The Reasonable Believer, supra note 428, at 1550). 
441.  Abrams, The Reasonable Believer, supra note 428, at 1550. 
442.  Id. 
 443.  See Godsil, supra note 433, at 284 (proposing a “reasonable community member” 
standard in Equal Protection cases, “in which the government action would be examined from the 
perspective of a reasonable member of the affected or allegedly harmed community”).  Professor 
Godsil suggests that this standard will invite the judge to empathize with the affected community, 
which “will be a step toward ensuring that the judge’s own perspective—or his own unconscious 
bias—does not influence his own determination of the message.”  Id. at 285. 
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the impression made by a religious display.  In this way, empathy can 
motivate decision-makers to question their unreflective biases and 
preconceptions. 
As Dan Simon explains, 
the problem is that judges would be required to alter habits of thought 
of which they are generally unaware, and over which they have very 
little control. . . . [H]owever, current research suggests that the distinc-
tion between automatic and controlled mental processes is not abso-
lutely impermeable.  Given the right conditions, people can break into 
automatic processes and, at least to some degree, overcome them. 444 
As the above discussion of schemas and implicit bias proves, 
overcoming automatic processes is no easy feat.  “To begin to overcome 
these biases it is necessary that the person has both the cognitive 
capability and the motivation to do so.”445  No matter how much training 
they receive, judges can only avoid biases that are known to them.  Even 
when they desire to render a “fair” decision, subconscious influences can 
cloud their decisions and impede their legal reasoning.  Therefore, for 
judges to be fair, they must identify and then neutralize the effects of 
their subconscious influences.446  Although we can never hope to free 
ourselves of all implicit biases, the effect of empathy is to achieve a 
level of objectivity that Owen Fiss describes as “transcend[ing] the 
particular vantage point of the person offering the interpretation.”447 
444.  Simon, supra note 32, at 138. 
445.  Id. at 139. 
446.  Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Methods for 
Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 64-66 (2006). 
 447.  Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982).  See 
Godsil, supra note 433, at 288. 
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